Description
On this day proceedings began with the final portion of Dr Yutar’s cross-examination of Govan Mbeki. Dr Yutar spend almost the whole morning session before the lunchtime adjournment dealing with the evidence state witnesses such as Bennet Mashiyana, John Tshingane and Sikombuza Njikalane, had given against Govan Mbeki and all of which claimed that he had in fact been in Port Elizabeth in December, 1961, when acts of sabotage had been committed. The matter of sabotage was dealt with at length by Dr Yutar as well as certain exhibits which related to the soliciting of financial and military aid from African and socialist states by Nelson Mandela and Arthur Goldreich. A particularly interesting moment was when Dr Yutar read an entry from Nelson Mandela’s diary which stated “slept at house of Fish K”. It is interesting because although the prosecutor did not make anything of this comment, he clearly wanted it on the court record.  
Mr Fischer’s subsequent re-examination of Govan Mbeki was rather long in comparison to previous re-examinations which had taken place in the trial thus far. Many issues were dealt with in re-examination, perhaps the most significant of which was Govan Mbeki’s denial of the state’s suggestion that the ANC was a “Communist dominated” organisation. Following the re-examination of Govan Mbeki, Mr Fischer called Denis Goldberg, Accused No.3, to take the witness stand, and indicated that Mr Berrange would be conducting the examination-in-chief of this witness. Mr Berrange began his examination-in-chief of Denis Goldberg by asking him immediately whether he had at any time been a member of Umkhonto we Sizwe or its National High Command. It was only after Denis Goldberg replied “no”, in both regards, that Mr Berrange started to ask him a series of basic biographical questions regarding his career as an engineer and his earliest involvement in politics in Cape Town with the Congress of Democrats.
Mr Berrange was able to lead Denis Goldberg in regard to a substantial amount of evidence relating to Mamre Camp before Judge De Wet eventually called for proceedings to be adjourned until 10:00am the following morning.
Govan Mbeki’s Evidence
Further cross-examination by Dr Yutar.
Dr Yutar indicated that “with a bit of luck” he would be able to complete his cross-examination of Govan Mbeki by teatime. Dr Yutar began on this day by turning attention to the three state witnesses whose evidence suggested that Govan Mbeki must have been involved, or at least been deeply aware, of MK activities in Port Elizabeth before he became a member of the National High Command in Johannesburg in April, 1963. The first of these witnesses was Bennet Mashiyana from whose evidence Dr Yutar had already read extensively during the previous day’s proceedings. Govan Mbeki maintained that his opinion was that this witness, like others, had confused the term High Command with the ANC structures set up in the Eastern Cape during the State of Emergence in later 1960 and was not a reference to the Regional High Commands of the MK. As such he denied that he was the contact man between the Regional Commands of MK at Port Elizabeth and East London – adding that as far as he knew the latter did not even exist.
Dr Yutar suggested that the widespread confusion regarding the ANC structures and the MK Regional High Commands was an indication that members of these organisations, such as Bennet Mashiyana, saw no distinction between the two organisations. Thereafter the prosecutor went on to deal with the allegation that Govan Mbeki was the contact person between the National High Command and the Regional Commands in Port Elizabeth and East London which was also made by Bennet Mashiyana. Govan Mbeki denied this allegation and said that that evidence of this witness must be questioned because of the obvious confusion in his description of almost every political structure, of either the ANC or MK, as “High Commands”. Dr Yutar then dealt quickly with the allegation, implicit in the evidence of both John Tshingane and Sikombuza Njikalane, that Govan Mbeki had been involved in five related acts of sabotage on the night of 16th December, 1961, in Port Elizabeth. Dr Yutar summarised the evidence in this regard after which Govan Mbeki denied the allegation completely and accused the state witnesses of lying.
Dr Yutar then asked Govan Mbeki why he had told the court that there was no MK Regional Command at East London when Walter Sisulu, who sat in on meetings of the MK National High Command and was, like Govan Mbeki, a member of the ANC Secretariat, had told the court that there was such an MK body in existence in East London. Govan Mbeki explained that to his knowledge there was not MK Regional Command established in East London and that Walter Sisulu, who was not in a position to even know such a thing, was mistaken in suggesting that there was. Dr Yutar then turned attention to the question, which he had already put to Govan Mbeki on several previous occasions, which was exactly how the officials of MK had gone about recruiting members into the organisation. Govan Mbeki insisted that the ANC in South Africa had never done recruiting work for MK but he said that he could not say if such work had been done by the ANC abroad as he would not know. He added “I would not know the details but I should imagine they would usually go to the people they trusted and had worked with…” and approach them to join the secret organisation. Dr Yutar suggested that these people would have been members of the ANC but Govan Mbeki said they would have been members of any of the Congresses.
Dr Yutar then asked Govan Mbeki to name a single person from Congresses other than the ANC, aside from Harold Stranchan, who had been recruited to be members of the MK. Govan Mbeki once again replied that he would not know. Dr Yutar confirmed that from the time in April, 1963, when Govan Mbeki joined the National High Command in Johannesburg, he did know which individuals comprised the memberships of the various Regional Commands but was refusing to divulge the identities of these persons to the court. Attention was then turned by Dr Yutar, once again, to Exhibit T.25 which was a letter dated 30th May and addressed by Thunder to Dear OR. Govan Mbeki admitted that he had drawn up this document as a message from the MK National High Command to the ANC external mission. Govan Mbeki argued that this document clearly showed that MK were engaged in recruiting practices and not the ANC. Furthermore, he argued that it showed that the MK and the ANC were only joined by means of correspondence.
Reading the section under the sub-heading “Finance”, Dr Yutar suggested that “the ANC must have been in an awful mess” for Govan Mbeki to have expressed fears to Oliver Tambo that organisers may have to be laid off if monetary aid was not provided urgently. Govan Mbeki did not comment and Dr Yutar continued to read from the document and paused at the section which stated that the ANC had received some financial relief when Nelson Mandela returned from his trip throughout Africa with some monies for the organisation. After pausing Dr Yutar told Govan Mbeki that the state would be submitting an exhibit which showed that Nelson Mandela not only sought and acquired financial support from other African states in 1962, but military support as well. In his characteristically calm demeanour, Govan Mbeki told Dr Yutar that it was not possible for him to comment on this suggestion until this supposed exhibit was placed in front of him for his consideration.
Still reading from Exhibit T.25, Dr Yutar asked Govan Mbeki about the mention of a particular nurse who was “doubly qualified” to work with MK – and, specifically, Dr Yutar asked what had made this woman “doubly qualified”. Govan Mbeki identified the woman in question as Nurse Thandiwe Modise and suggested that her “double qualification” must have meant she had more than one certificate as a healthcare practitioner. Dr Yutar then asked “Is it not a fact that nurses in uniform were used by MK to convey bombs from JHB to Pretoria” for example in the sabotage attack on the Old Synagogue and the offices of the Minister of Agriculture. Govan Mbeki claimed that he had never heard of such a thing a nurses being used to transport bombs and maintained that he knew nothing about preparation or execution of either of these acts of sabotage.
Dr Yutar then turned attention briefly to Exhibit R.61 which he recalled Lionel Bernstein had denied was a document of the SACP. The document proposed fostering “Unity in the Transkei” so as to “Overthrow the Nationalist Regime by armed struggle” and Dr Yutar asked Govan Mbeki which organisation, speaking generally, was working to create unity in the Transkei. Govan Mbeki, clarifying that he was speaking generally, enthusiastically said that the ANC had always been working and aspiring to bring unity to the Transkei, but insisted that this could not be an ANC or MK issued document. The reason why it could not have been issued by either of these organisations, according to Govan Mbeki, was because the phrase identifying MK as the “military wing” of the ANC was incorrect and would never have been used by those writing on behalf of these organisations. Dr Yutar said “I'm not going to waste my time” and swiftly returned his focus to the document Govan Mbeki had written (Exhibit T.25).
At this stage Dr Yutar dealt with the section of Exhibit T.25 in which Govan Mbeki had discussed arrangements for the airlifting of a group of recruits on the 4th of June as well as the fact that the postal addresses of Amien Cajee and “Dreyer” were no longer good and that this message should be passed on to Dar es Salaam if necessary. Dr Yutar asked where Govan Mbeki had got the name Amien Cajee from and why his and the address of “Dreyer” were not good anymore. Govan Mbeki explained that he had known Mr Cajee for a long time through the newspaper Spark and said that the post boxes must have been closed for one or another reason. He added that he had not known Amien Cajee as a member of the Transvaal Indian Congress. Dr Yutar then turned his focus away from Exhibit T.25 and placed it on the more general matter of what he called the “very serious” acts of sabotage which were committed by MK during the period of time following April, 1963, when Govan Mbeki became one of the members of the National High Command.
Govan Mbeki asked Dr Yutar what he meant by acts of sabotage which were of a “serious” nature and conceded that, according to the schedule of items provided by the state, there had been acts of sabotage committed during his time as a member of the NHC. Dr Yutar asked if Govan Mbeki “as a responsible leader” had never bothered to find out about the acts of sabotage carried out by the MK. Govan Mbeki replied that he might have looked into some of them. When Dr Yutar asked if the leadership had taken any steps to ensure that those recruited to commit acts of sabotage had “qualifications” Govan Mbeki asked what kind of qualifications Dr Yutar was suggesting – educational or some other kind of qualification. Dr Yutar said “Qualifications in sabotage – explosives!”
Govan Mbeki explained that there was no reason why an ordinary MK member should have any qualifications in explosives because the technical experts would have prepared the materials and the unit members would merely have to place it at the necessary location and get safely away before detonating it. Dr Yutar suggested that it was because of this policy and practice that Peter Molefe was killed and Benjamin Ramotse was seriously injured; after which he proposed to look “at some of the acts committed during your [Govan Mbeki's] regime”. Dr Yutar asked if Govan Mbeki considered the throwing of petrol bombs onto the roof of a Bantu Beer Hall in Langa in June, 1963, to have been a “serious” act of sabotage. Govan Mbeki once again questioned the meaning of the term “serious” and reasoned that because the purpose was to destroy the building, which was within MK policy, and it was unoccupied by people, he did not consider this a serious act of sabotage but just an act of sabotage. Dr Yutar stated “That is your view and that is why I said to you, at the opening of your cross-examination, that you are a ruthless person – you will do anything to achieve, irrespective of the consequences, to achieve what you want to achieve”.
Govan Mbeki said the same thing when Dr Yutar asked him about the blowing up of railway signal boxes with dynamite insisting that such an act fitted well within the policy of the MK. When Dr Yutar asked if it would be serious if the destruction of a signal box resulted in the collision of two trains the council for the defence interrupted proceedings and drew Dr Yutar into an inaudible discussion for a few moments before Judge De Wet said that the council should make its objections through the court.  Thereafter, the side discussion stopped and the court fell silent before Dr Yutar address Govan Mbeki once more. The prosecutor told Govan Mbeki and the court that in light of what was said by his learned friend he would desist from discussing further particular acts of sabotage. Instead he surmised that Govan Mbeki was claiming that MK had committed acts of sabotage in order to “bring home to the white people the urgency of the situation… you added too it was also designed to strike terror into the hearts of the white man”.
Govan Mbeki denied the phrasing of the second part of Dr Yutar's suggestion and clarified that what he had said was that the purpose of sabotage “was to shock the white electorate into the realisation of the reality of the grievances of the African people” and denied that it was to put fear into the hearts and minds of all white South Africans. Dr Yutar put it to Govan Mbeki that the purpose of sabotage campaigns was also to “inspire confidence in the black man” as well as to get political concessions and reform from the government. Govan Mbeki agreed with both of these points before Dr Yutar asked “Is it not a fact that from October, 1961, until April, 1963, the government had not acceded to any of the political demands of the ANC?” In responding to this question Govan Mbeki said the following:
That is correct but it is not the premise of our argument. Our argument is: If we are not in a position to shift the Government then we must create conditions whereby the white electorate will itself exercise pressure to shift the government. And I think this has been achieved, this has certainly been achieved, in the writing themselves…
Before Govan Mbeki could conclude his point Judge De Wet interrupted him and, addressing Dr Yutar, said that the court had already heard evidence on this issue and did not feel it was necessary to hear it again. Dr Yutar made no objection to Judge De Wet's comment and instead put it plainly to Govan Mbeki “that you had reached an impasse as a result of which your organisation had decided on guerrilla warfare”. Govan Mbeki only managed to say the word “No” before Dr Yutar asked “Can you tell his lordship why Goldreich was sent overseas in December 1962”. Evidently wanting to take hold of an opportunity provided to him by Dr Yutar's first suggestion Govan Mbeki replied, “Now, I must deal with the first portion of your question. I do not think it is correct, in the light of what is happening in South Africa, to interpret the situation as having reached an impasse…” Dr Yutar, however, was unwilling to give Govan Mbeki a chance to address the suggestion further and insisted that he answer the question regarding Arthur Goldreich.
Govan Mbeki explained that Arthur Goldreich had been sent overseas in order to study techniques for manufacturing explosives to be used for sabotage campaigns in South Africa. Dr Yutar questioned the validity of this claim in light of the fact that acts of sabotage had been commencing for a long period of time before Arthur Goldreich went overseas. Govan Mbeki explained that although acts of sabotage had been committed, “the knowledge that had been acquired up until that time was certainly inadequate”. Dr Yutar's main suggestion in dealing yet again with this topic, and the matter of Nelson Mandela's trip throughout Africa, was that both Arthur Goldreich and Nelson Mandela were sent on missions abroad in late-1962 in order to solicit not only financial aid and the supply of explosives for sabotage but military assistance and the future supply of arms for guerrilla warfare and an armed insurrection to overthrow the South African government.
A particularly interesting moment was when Dr Yutar read to the court a particular extract from pages 204 and 205 of Nelson Mandela's dairy (Exhibit R.70) which stated “Slept at house of Fish K” during January, 1962. Govan Mbeki simply said “I don't know” and Dr Yutar moved on to another related extract from the dairy which read “accompanied by Mlangeni” on Sunday 14th January, 1962. Govan Mbeki said that this was not Mlangeni and spelt out the name “Mlonye” and said that he did not know this person. Dr Yutar continued to read many extracts from Nelson Mandela's dairy before court was adjourned for the teatime break. It turns out that Dr Yutar's hope that he would be finished by the teatime adjournment was in vain as he would continue to cross-examine Govan Mbeki until shortly before the lunchtime adjournment.
In these last two or so hours of Govan Mbeki's cross-examination Dr Yutar put a host of additional documents to the witness all of which related to the MK and the ANC external mission. Dr Yutar pushed his allegation that the ANC (Like the Communist Party) had purposefully deceived people both within and outside of South Africa so as to promote support and foster the conditions of possibility for a mass campaign of violence against the white people and government of South Africa with the support of African and Socialist states hostile towards South Africa. Before concluding, Dr Yutar dealt with at least a dozen Travallyn exhibits which the state alleged, amongst other things, were proof that a decision to adopt tactics of guerrilla warfare had already been taken and that Govan Mbeki, as a member of the National High Command, was well aware of this fact. The final matter dealt with by Dr Yutar in cross-examining Govan Mbeki was the evidence which had been given against Govan Mbeki by Bruno Mtolo and Abel Mtembu. Govan Mbeki maintained that both men had told lies about him to the court for the likely reason that they believed that in doing so they would have a greater chance of being released from jail.
Re-examination by Mr Fischer.
Mr Fischer began his re-examination by observing the difficulties that had arisen due to the unexpectedly large quantity of documents put to Govan Mbeki by the state. He then turned attention to certain extracts of Nelson Mandela's diary which had been put to Govan Mbeki. After discussing and clarifying his position in regard to these extracts Govan Mbeki confirmed that there was nothing in this dairy which contradicted or conflicted with the evidence he had given in chief and that the dairy made no mention of ANC volunteers being used as MK recruits as suggested by the state. Thereafter Mr Fischer dealt with Exhibit R.10, a circular issued by the ANC in anticipation of the 26 June Commemoration, which had been drafted by Govan Mbeki. In regard to this document Govan Mbeki explained that the ANC members were expected to do everything which fell under the heading “Action Action Action!” such as to tell stories of the ANC struggle around bonfires, avoid using electric lights that night, and a boycott of shops and four Nationalist publications. This, according to Govan Mbeki, was the only part of this document which was a directive.
Mr Fischer used this document as a basis from which to show what work the ANC, particularly in regard to its recruiting of volunteers in the Transkei, had been doing at the time when MK units were engaged in perpetuating acts of sabotage. Mr Fischer then went on to deal with many of the Travallyn exhibits which were put to Govan Mbeki by Dr Yutar and the allegation that the MK, under the political guidance of the ANC, had in fact decided to embark upon a campaign of guerrilla warfare aided by international organisations and states hostile towards the South African government and seeking to support its overthrow by violent means. Govan Mbeki's denial of this allegation, and his evidencing of this denial through Mr Fischer's questions in relation to these documents, consumed the proceedings right up until the lunchtime adjournment.
Following the lunchtime adjournment Mr Fischer informed Govan Mbeki that he had made a mistake in confusing Exhibits T.42 and T.79 and clarified that it was the latter exhibit which Govan Mbeki wrote and was about the importance of getting 90-day detainees released. Attention was then placed on Exhibit T.77 which was headed “Syllabus for Political Education: ANC Groups”, and written by Govan Mbeki as a member of the NEC, and Mr Fischer asked why political organisation of ANC members was considered important by those in the NEC. Govan Mbeki explained that political education was important “in order to get members of the ANC to be familiar with the policies of the ANC it was necessary that we should run political study groups…” Mr Fischer thus surmised that it was important for the ANC itself to give its members political training and then asked what the attitude was towards political education of members in Umkhonto we Sizwe. Govan Mbeki explained that it was also necessary for the members of MK to receive political training and it was in part for this reason that he had helped draft the introductory section to the document “Speakers Notes”.
Mr Fischer then went on to deal with Exhibits T.33 and T.34 which were headed “Police documentations” and “Documentation on Defence Force”, respectively. Govan Mbeki insisted that these two documents were completely different and separate despite the fact that they had been pinned together when the state presented them in court. Mr Fischer did not spend long re-examining Govan Mbeki on these or other exhibits and he was able to deal with a great number of them in a relatively short period of time. When Mr Fischer was dealing with Exhibit T.1, headed “Production Requirements” and allegedly presented by Arthur Goldreich to a meeting of the MK National High Command, Judge De Wet asked what Mr Fischer was getting at in leading the witness in regard to this and other exhibits which the defence would say were at best investigations into the Operation Mayibuye plan which had not yet been decided upon. Mr Fischer agreed with Judge De Wet and added that it was perhaps the wrong time for him to have brought up the issue in such a way.
One of the important new themes discussed by Govan Mbeki under re-examination was the inherent difficulties associated with keeping a political organisation alive and active underground under conditions of illegality. To help the court understand this difficulty Govan Mbeki gave the example of married couples whom had broken up because of the fact that either husband or wife was involved ANC activities, such as political education study groups, of which they were not allowed to tell the other about. Those married couples who “still belonged to the ANC” had to negotiate their relationship in such a way that the partner who was uninvolved in certain political activities would not push the other for details of these activities and, like Lionel Bernstein, would chose not to know details unless it was absolutely necessary. Mr Fischer used this as a opportunity to suggest that it was thus in no way unbelievable that the members of the ANC NEC would have no idea who the members of the MK NHC or Regional Commands would have been for similar reasons of maintaining a necessary level of secrecy around the work of these banned and illegal organisations.
Govan Mbeki also told Mr Fischer that members of the NHC of MK did not know when, where, or by whom, particular acts of sabotage was to be carried out by MK units. Their influence over the perpetration of acts of sabotage was in setting out the national overarching policy of the MK – in terms of the selection of appropriate targets and the limitations placed on the kinds of acts embarked upon – which was to be followed strictly by all MK members and enforced at the unit and regional levels. Mr Fischer then asked Govan Mbeki to clarify, in light of his refusal to comment when asked by Dr Yutar, on whether or not Ahmed Kathrada had at any time been a member of the MK NHC. Govan Mbeki clarified that the NHC of MK was not a body comprised of representatives from other political organisations (such as the Indian Congress) and that Ahmed Kathrada had certainly not been a member of the NHC before or after the time when Govan Mbeki joined in April, 1963.
When Mr Fischer asked Govan Mbeki where his son Thabo Mbeki was currently situated, in light of the state's claim that he was the Thabo referred to in Exhibit R.21 as being part of the external mission, Govan Mbeki said that his son was currently enrolled as a student at Sussex University in England. Then, shifting attention by to MK, Mr Fischer asked Govan Mbeki to explain what exactly had been the function of the Intelligence Department established by MK. Govan Mbeki explained that “Originally its function was that of counter-intelligence to find out what the police were planning to do to the organisation, against its leaders, and secondly to make a survey of targets for sabotage”. Mr Fischer confirmed with Govan Mbeki that all this had been done and directed in terms of MK's overarching policies. Mr Fischer then asked about the emergence and functions of the Technical Committee/Department of MK. Govan Mbeki said that “it also came into existence at around the same time as sabotage activities started and its function at the national level… was to carry out some sort of research work as to how to make bombs and then pass on such knowledge to the Technical Committees for the Regional Commands”. Govan Mbeki confirmed that Arthur Goldreich was the head of the Technical Committee at the national level and was the Chairman of the Logistics Department when it was formed.
Mr Fischer asked Govan Mbeki to give the court an idea of the MK people whom Arthur Goldreich would have met or known of from working in his two capacities for the Technical and Logistics Committees. Govan Mbeki said that Arthur Goldreich would have known the members of the Regional Technical Committees and would have had regular contact with the members of the NHC in their individual capacities. Mr Fischer did not take the matter any further and instead asked Govan Mbeki to discuss the question of the alleged manufacturing of land mines and hand grenades by MK. Govan Mbeki told the court that there were never, as far as he knew, any instructions issued by the NHC for MK members to manufacture either land mines or hand grenades. He added that, as a member of the NHC, he would certainly have known if any such instructions had been given. Govan Mbeki explained that the sample box which had been presented in this court had been shown to him before by Arthur Goldreich at Rivonia. According to Govan Mbeki, Arthur Goldreich told him that this box was a model of a kind of land mine at Rivonia, but made no suggestion that this model was going to be reproduced on a mass scale for MK activities.
The next question dealt with by Mr Fischer was that of what was supposed to happen with the recruits who had been sent for military training in Algeria had they not been arrested on their return into South Africa in June. Govan Mbeki explained that the intention was to integrate these recruits into the existing machinery of MK and into sabotage units in particular. Mr Fischer then asked Govan Mbeki what had happened when he had been charged in connection to the commission of acts of sabotage in Port Elizabeth and put on trial. Govan Mbeki explained that in that case the main witness for the state eventually admitted that he had “been compelled” to say thing that incriminated Govan Mbeki and as a result Govan Mbeki was discharged. After a short while Mr Fischer then turned his attention to the state's allegation concerning “Communist domination of the ANC” which Govan Mbeki immediately denied once again. Mr Fischer explained that it was important to consider this allegation because it is related directly to the states suggestion that “the court should reasonably accept as probable” the fact that Nelson Mandela told people in Natal that they should hide their Communist sympathies. In challenging the validity of this suggestion Mr Fischer mentioned well-known Communist leaders of the ANC, such as Moses Kotane and J.B. Marks, and the fact that they never attempted to hide their communist views or mislead people in that regard.
In the concluding moments of Govan Mbeki's re-examination he dealt quickly with a number of issues such as: the meaning of the term “Uhuru” identified in the oath found in the overalls worn by Raymond Mhlaba on the day of the Rivonia raid; the use of the SK Building and Travallyn for MK recruits in transit; as well as the fact that neither Nelson Mandela nor Govan Mbeki had resigned from the ANC NEC when they joined the NHC of MK. Perhaps the most interesting information which came to the fore in the closing minutes of Govan Mbeki's re-examination was the fact that the West Bank Branch of the ANC in East London which had called itself the “High Command”, according to state witnesses' evidence, was in fact one of the smallest branches of the ANC on a national level and did not even have the equivalent membership and effectiveness of the its immediate neighbour which was the East Bank Branch in East London.
Denis Goldberg's Evidence
Examination-in-chief by Mr Berrange.
Mr Berrange began his examination-in-chief of Denis Goldberg by asking him whether he had at any time been a member of Umkhonto we Sizwe or the National High Command. Denis Goldberg replied no in both respects after which Mr Berrange began to lead him in regard to his personal life, professional career as a civil engineer, and political activities for the last ten years. Denis Goldberg told the court that he was 31 years old; married with two children; and that his wife and kids were currently living in London. He had lived and worked in Cape Town up until May, 1963, when he left for Johannesburg. He attained his Bachelor's Degree in Civil Engineering from UCT in 1955 and had been employed on various jobs for South African Railways and Harbours since 1953. In December, 1955, he was employed by the Cape Town City Council until 1958 when he joined the R.H. Morris (LTD) construction company and, subsequently in October, 1960, he joined another consulting engineering firm called Kantly and Templar.
Having established this basic biographical information Mr Berrange asked Denis Goldberg plainly if he had ever been a member of the South African Communist Party – which, Denis Goldberg answered, he had not been. Denis Goldberg described his political beliefs as centring on the abolition of the colour bar which was “the crucial problem in South Africa… Because in my own life, looking around me, I have seen the complete denial of social justice to the non-white people in South Africa”. In regard to the question of the franchise Denis Goldberg said “I believe that all people are entitled to the franchise” and where that right is denied, as for black people in South Africa, he believed “they had a right to organise to achieve that right”. In sum Denis Goldberg told the court that he believed that it was right and just to fight for political equality. When Mr Berrange asked Denis Goldberg what he had done in the last ten years to implement his beliefs, Denis Goldberg replied, “I did as much as I could in the political sphere to bring this about”. Denis Goldberg said that he had not personally gained anything (such as individual wealth or privilege) as a result of his commitment to the struggle for political equality in South Africa and that he “fully supported” the content of the Freedom Charter.
Mr Berrange, in anticipation of this subject being broached under cross-examination, asked Denis Goldberg what kind of literature one would find on his bookshelves at home. Denis Goldberg said that he owned books on a wide variety of subjects and, with the tone of a man expecting to be challenged extensively on the matter later, admitted that there were also one or two books dealing with the political theory of Marxism. This admission led Mr Berrange to ask Denis Goldberg what his general attitude towards the idea of Communism was in light of the fact that he had never joined the Communist Party in South Africa. Denis Goldberg told the court that he simply had not read enough to say whether he was either for or against the idea of communism. He explained that it was apparent to him from this trial that “communists seem to have a fairly involved political philosophy which I would have to study deeply before I commit myself to it”. Thereafter, he reiterated that his chief political concern was the abolition of the colour bar by which he meant the “political policy of maintaining differences between people, artificial differences, on the basis of colour”.
Returning attention to some specific events in Denis Goldberg's life, Mr Berrange asked the witness when he first became involved in politics. In 1950 Denis Goldberg joined a political organisation, with a multi-racial membership and no one particular ideology as such, called the Modern Youth Society in Cape Town. Denis Goldberg did not discuss the activities of this society in court but did state that it was the multi-racialism of the organisation which attracted him to it. Eventually he became an official of this organisation and attracted the attention of the Security Branch as a result. Denis Goldberg told the court that it was “inevitable that any organisation standing for non-racialism” would be hounded by the Security Branch who raided its offices and well as Denis Goldberg's home and the homes of some other officials several times. According to Denis Goldberg since 1954 the Security Branch Police had raided his home in Cape Town anywhere between 10 and 15 times despite the fact that neither he, nor the Modern Youth Society, had ever committed any criminal offence.
It was in 1955 that Denis Goldberg joined the Congress of Democrats (COD), whose constitution he described as very similar to the UN 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, even after it was adapted in light of the creation of the Freedom Charter. He described the organisation as having been formed on the initiative of the ANC for the twofold purpose:
To show that the [defiance] campaign wasn't directed against whites but against white supremacy. Longer term, to demonstrate that there was a body of whites who were prepared to work harmoniously with non-whites and to show non-whites as well the same thing.
As a member of the COD in Cape Town, Denis Goldberg became heavily involved in working with members of the other congresses in organising public political meetings, fund raising events and, most importantly, camps where people of different races “got together and socialised as equals”. Mr Berrange then turned attention directly to the question of Mamre Camp. Denis Goldberg insisted that Mamre Camp was merely the latest of a series of similar camps he had run on behalf of the Coloured Peoples' Congress (CPC) and the African Youth League (AYL) in the Western Cape both before and after the banning of the COD in September, 1962. Denis Goldberg discussed some of the camps and picnics he had organised and run in the past and highlighted the fact that “the Security Policy always seemed to be there whenever we organised such an occasion… They would do anything, in fact, to hamper and harass the holding of these functions” despite the fact that there was “nothing illegal” about them.
Denis Goldberg explained that prior to its banning the COD had worked closely with the ANC on joint campaigns. In 1956, for example, Denis Goldberg was elected to be a member on an Ad Hoc Committee established after the Treason Trial arrests, which was called the “We Stand By Our Leaders Committee”, and was responsible for organising general fund raising. When Denis Goldberg was detained for four months in 1960, in connection with his political work, he lost his job as an engineer at a power plant in Cape Town. Mr Berrange then asked Denis Goldberg specifically about an incident in which he had been involved during the first commemoration of the Sharpeville massacre in Cape Town. Denis Goldberg told the court that on this occasion a mass peaceful demonstration had been organised to take place but the gathering was prohibited by the police on the very morning it was supposed to take place. As such the organisers, including Denis Goldberg, and a large crowd of supporters gathered in the streets with no way of knowing that to do so had in fact been prohibited.
The police threatened to baton charge the crowd when they refused to disperse and, according to Denis Goldberg, “At that point I offered to use the police public address system to address the crowd… and I asked them to disperse to avoid what could have been a very ugly incident”. Mr Berrange then turned attention to the Langa riot and asked Denis Goldberg if he had ever heard of this event as one involving sabotage as suggested in the evidence of state witness W/O Hugget. Denis Goldberg said that he had never heard of such a thing and that, from the information he had gone out of his way at the time to get, it was clear that the police van which had been turned over and set alight was attacked “spontaneously” by a group forming part of the larger crowd who were protesting against the forced removal of Africans from the Western Cape. Shifting attention back to the COD, Mr Berrange asked Denis Goldberg to list some of the main activities undertaken by this organisation before it was banned in 1962. The main goal of the COD was, according to Denis Goldberg, to propagate the view to white South Africans that the only lasting solution to racial tensions in this country was the abolition of the colour bar and the granting of equal rights to all people. The organisation did this primarily through the holding of public meetings and by distributing propaganda in the form of pamphlets, leaflets, and booklets to the general public.
Mr Berrange then asked Denis Goldberg if he knew the man named Solwandle Looksmart Ngudle. Denis Goldberg answered that he had got to know him in joint campaigns of the ANC and COD and socially as a friend. He added “I thought he was a man to be admired for his sincerity and his devotion to his people”. Returning focus to the COD, Denis Goldberg explained that after it was banned he continued doing political work, mainly of a propagandist and fund raising nature, with the CPC in Cape Town. He claimed to have only heard of the formation of MK for the first time in the National Sunday paper issued during the week of 16th December, 1961, which included a print out of the manifesto of Umkhonto we Sizwe. It was only at this stage that Mr Berrange finally returned his attention, and the attention of the court, to the specific matter of the Mamre Camp.
Denis Goldberg told the court that he had been approached to organise and run a multi-racial camp by the CPC, in association with the AYL, at Mamre for two purposes. The first purpose of the camp was to be a recreational holiday for members of the Congress Alliance. The second, and more important purpose of the camp was to provide young members of the Congress Alliance with the necessary skills required for them to step up and full the leadership roles which had become widely available because of the prolific banning and arrest of existing NLM leaders in the Cape. In regard to this second purpose Denis Goldberg explained that the aim was to provide “political education and education of a general nature, a general practical nature” to these members. Denis Goldberg claimed that the reason he had been asked to run this camp was because of his extensive past experience in organising and heading other similar events.
Denis Goldberg told Mr Berrange that he did not wish to be seen as hiding the fact that the primary purpose of this camp was to provide political education, and necessary practical skills and understanding, to young Congress members in order to ameliorate the pervasive difficulty political organisers for the Congress Alliance in Cape Town were experiencing in trying to find replacements for leaders who had been banned or detained. In addition to this political education there would also be activities of a completely non-political nature, according to Denis Goldberg, such as games, hikes, music, reading and other recreational activities. Mr Berrange directed Denis Goldberg to maintain a focus on the question of political education and asked what was intended to be taught to the campers at Mamre. Denis Goldberg said that the main intention was for himself and other organisers to facilitate discussions and considerations of various forms of “violent and non-violent change taking place in other countries”. It was for this purpose that Denis Goldberg had brought along with him to the camp Africa Publications pamphlets on Algeria, Angola, and the Congo, in order to provide a factual basis for these discussions.
Denis Goldberg claimed that there was nothing “sinister” about these pamphlets which all mentioned guerrilla warfare in passing but “primarily they discussed the political conditions which lead to a situation of violent change”. He added that these documents all primarily discussed and analysed situations of non-violent change, “except for the Congo where the change was non-violent until after independence”, and as such were “certainly not manuals on guerrilla warfare”. He explained that, although guerrilla warfare was not one of the subjects decided upon by the organisers, because campers were required to listen to the news on the radio every morning – and a group of them would have to make a presentation concerning its content – the matter of guerrilla warfare was raised and discussed by the campers. This was a result of the fact that “Cuba and the Congo were hot news at the time” and thus the discussion of guerrilla warfare “led naturally from a discussion of the news”. Denis Goldberg claimed that when some of the youngest campers expressed enthusiasm at the idea he announced to the group that his opinion was that guerrilla warfare was not feasible in the South African context and that “the basis of political victory was political knowledge, understanding, and efficient organisation”.
Mr Berrange then turned attention to the evidence given by state witnesses Cyril Davids and Caswell Mboxela. In describing the evidence given by these two witnesses Denis Goldberg said that “Large parts of it are true and large parts are false. I think that they have twisted and distorted parts of their evidence”. Mr Berrange first led Denis Goldberg in regard to those aspects of evidence which he admitted were correct which were: that he had given a lecture on the use of a duplicating machine; that Cyril Davids gave a lecture on telephonology; and that Cardiff Marney had given a lecture on an internal combustion (motor car) engine. Mr Berrange then asked if it was correct to suggest that these lectures (and Judo demonstrations) were intended to train campers in the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare. Denis Goldberg called this suggestion ridiculous and added that the suggestion made by these witnesses that he had openly told them and the others that the purpose of Mamre Camp was for the training of young guerrillas was “absolutely crazy” and it would have been incredibly stupid of him to have done so even if it was the case – which he insisted it was not. Mr Berrange then asked Denis Goldberg to give the court an idea as to why he was referred to as Comrade Commandant by the campers at Mamre; particularly, in light of the state's suggestion that the term “comrade” was a communist one.
Denis Goldberg began by explaining that the word “comrade” was not only used by communists and had in fact been used commonly amongst members of the Labour Party in Britain, and formerly by the Labour Party in South Africa, amongst other non-communist organisations. He then told the court that “Comrade Commandant” had been given to him as a nickname by the campers because of a misunderstanding that led to him being criticised as acting as “a one-man-boss”. Denis Goldberg explained that because there was only one vehicle available to transport all of the people, food and equipment to the Mamre Camp site it was necessary for the bus to make two trips. He came on the second trip and by the time he arrived at the site he found that all of the tents had been set up in a thicket of trees and dense bushes. Unhappy with this location he suggested that the tents be taken down and moved to a more open space which would just be easier and nicer to stay in. Mr Berrange interrupted Denis Goldberg at this stage to make the point that far from concealing the presence of the campers, Denis Goldberg had actually chosen to make them more visible to surrounding neighbours and people passing by. Denis Goldberg continued and told the court that it was because of the way in which he appeared to arrive on the site and immediately order people around, and out of the related annoyance of the campers who had to redo their work, he was nicknamed “Comrade Commandant”.
Mr Berrange then told Denis Goldberg that he wanted to deal with the programme of activities at the camp and he did so by considering the record albums and short stories which were found by the police at Mamre Camp. After Denis Goldberg read out a list he had drawn up for Judge De Wet of the record albums he had taken to Mamre Camp – which included names such as Miriam Makeba, Mozart, Beethoven, Chinese songs from the fight against Japan, Trade Union songs from the United States of America, Ella Fitzgerald, Louis Armstrong, and others – he explained that one of the activities campers engaged in was listening to these records and singing songs about African leaders and the struggle for freedom around the bonfire at night. Denis Goldberg explained that the campers were split into groups of four and each chose to elect a leader who was referred to as Sergeant. Each group would be given different tasks during the day to complete (cleaning being the worst) and then all groups would attend lectures and engage in the numerous recreational activities and sports available thereafter. The books of short stories which were brought for campers to read and engage with at the camp, according to Denis Goldberg, were selected in order to show how people all around the world struggled for independence in different ways.
Mr Berrange then moved on to focus on those aspects of Cyril Davids' and Caswell Mboxela's evidence which Denis Goldberg claimed was incorrect. In addition to denying the fact that he had ever told Cyril Davids or Caswell Mboxela that the purpose of Mamre Camp was to train young guerrillas, Denis Goldberg also claimed that the nine or ten empty bottles found at Mamre had not, as Caswell Mboxela said, been used for the purpose of teaching techniques of throwing petrol bombs but were to be used as water containers for recreational hikes. Mr Berrange then asked Denis Goldberg if the court should reasonably find anything suspicious about the fact that he ordered for all fires to be put out before campers went to sleep at night. Denis Goldberg told Mr Berrange that this was a standard safety precaution practised, to his knowledge, but all organisers of large events and that it was not done with the intention of trying to evade police detection and capture. Denis Goldberg said that there was no way in which they could have possibly escaped the police and added that when the police did arrive at the camp site they made no attempt to escape at all.
Denis Goldberg spent a significant amount of time explaining why the practical lectures, such as that on the duplicating machines and telephonology, were considered important and necessary to teach to the Congress members. The lecture on the proper use and maintenance of a duplicator machine was obviously necessary for the purpose of training potential future leaders in a fundamental aspect of propaganda work. The purpose of Cyril Davids' lecture on telephonology, however, was less obvious and required some more detailed explanation from Denis Goldberg. According to Denis Goldberg the purpose of Cyril Davids' lecture was actually to provide campers with a basic understanding of the practical principles of electricity which was essential as sound and lighting systems were constantly breaking down at Congress events and future leaders had to be able to deal with such eventualities. The reason they had chosen to demonstrate these principles of electricity with telephones was, according to Denis Goldberg, because showing campers how to use electric circuits to connect two telephones (and allowing them to do so themselves and talk to each other between different tents) was an exciting and captivating way to get them excited and engaged in understanding these principles.
The telephone connections were extremely weak and rudimentary, according to Denis Goldberg, and by implication not the sophisticated field communication system for guerrilla troops suggested by Dr Yutar and the state. Denis Goldberg went on to say that the lecture on the motorcar engine was done because of the high level of interest in basic mechanics expressed amongst the young membership of the Congress; and that the lectures on First Aid training provided useful skills which would benefit members in their political work, in their homes in the townships, and in workplaces such as factories. The physical training intended to take place at the camp blended with the recreational aspect of its programme and according to Denis Goldberg campers were provided with the equipment to do sports such as boxing, cricket, soccer, volley ball and Judo. Eventually Mr Berrange asked, “In short Mr Goldberg, was there anything illegal whatsoever in what you were doing and in what was being done at this camp?” Denis Goldberg replied “Nothing at all” and added that the local residents in the area had seen them arrive, had heard them singing songs, and that one man from a neighbouring property had even come and sat in on one of the lectures on the first day. This, coupled with the fact that they had bought all of their vegetables and some other groceries from the local village, was a clear indication in Denis Goldberg's mind that he and the campers had made no effort whatsoever to keep their presence a secret.
Mr Berrange then turned to deal with the presence of Albie Sachs at the Mamre Camp site on the day they were visited by the police. Denis Goldberg explained that Albie Sachs was not a camper and had come on the day in question in order to give a lecture on political economy theory. In this lecture Albie Sachs emphasised the importance of the gold mines in shaping the South African economy and the potential that these mines may be nationalised at some point in the future. During the discussion of the lectures given by Albie Sachs, Jude De Wet called for the adjournment and proceedings were held over until the following morning.  
Sources
Dictabelts: (Vol.55/Belt 128e) (Vol.55/Belt 129e) (Vol.55/Belt 130e) (Vol.55/Belt 131e) (Vol.55/Belt 132e) (Vol.55/Belt 133e) (Vol.55/Belt 134e) (Vol.54/Belt 135e) (Vol.54/Belt 136e) (Vol.54/Belt 137e).
Percy Yutar Papers:
Handwritten notes from the prosecution for 12th May, 1964, (Ms.385/36/1).
File of Miscellaneous Documents: Goldberg, No.3 – General. (MS.385/31/2/4).
File of Miscellaneous Documents: Goldberg, No.3 – Mamre. (MS.385/31/2/5).
File of Miscellaneous Documents: Goldberg, No.3 – Preparation - Sabotage. (MS.385/31/2/6).
File containing details about Accused Nos. 1-7: TS, Accused No.3 [Denis Goldberg] (MS.385/31/3/3) and (MS.385/31/3/4).
File containing details about Accused Nos. 1-7: TS, Accused No.4 [Govan Mbeki] (MS.385/31/3/5).
Govan Mbeki [Acc.No.4] [Large sections missing, starts at p.331] (MS.385/8).
WITS Historical Papers:
Govan Mbeki's Evidence (copy). (AD1844.A28.1).
Extract of Govan Mbeki's Evidence (copy). (AD1844.A28.2).
Mbeki's Personal Position. (AD1844.A30b12).
Notes made by Govan Mbeki regarding his interrogation while in detention. (AD1844.Bc1).
Key Words
Govan Mbeki, Denis Goldberg, Port Elizabeth, Cape Town, Arthur Goldreich, Operation Mayibuye, Sabotage, ANC, Communism, COD, Congress Alliance, SACP, Mamre Camp, Albie Sachs.