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**REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE  
DEMARCATIION/DELIMITATION OF SPRs**

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**31 JULY 1993**

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***STRICTLY EMBARGOED UNTIL TABLING AT THE  
NEGOTIATION COUNCIL ON MONDAY 2 AUGUST 1993***

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## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

### **LIST OF COMMISSION MEMBERS**

### **MAP**

<i>Chapter 1</i>	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<i>Chapter 2</i>	<b>AGREEMENTS ON REGIONAL GOVERNMENT BY THE NEGOTIATION COUNCIL.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<i>Chapter 3</i>	<b>INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE ON THE DEMARCATIION/DELIMITATION OF REGIONS.....</b>	<b>10</b>
<i>Chapter 4</i>	<b>CRITERIA FOR THE DEMARCATIION OF REGIONS.....</b>	<b>16</b>
<i>Chapter 5</i>	<b>RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE DEMARCATIION/ DELIMITATION OF SPRs.....</b>	<b>23</b>

### **APPENDIX**

<i>A</i>	<b>SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILES OF THE PROPOSED SPRs DEMARCATIION/DELIMITATED</b>
<i>B</i>	<b>LIST OF WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS</b>
<i>C</i>	<b>LIST OF ORAL HEARINGS HELD BY THE COMMISSION</b>
<i>D</i>	<b>LIST OF SUPPORT STAFF</b>

### **MINORITY OPINIONS**

*	<b>COMMENTS ON MINORITY OPINIONS</b>
*	<b>MINORITY OPINION: MR KOOS REYNEKE</b>
*	<b>MINORITY OPINION: MS ANN BERNSTEIN</b>



# **CHAPTER 1**

## **INTRODUCTION**

### **1. Background**

On Friday 28 May 1993, the Negotiating Council of the Multi-Party Negotiating Process established a Commission on the Delimitation / Demarcation of SPR's, on the recommendation of the Planning Committee. The Terms of Reference as well as the names of the 15-member Commission were agreed to at this meeting.

This Commission held its first meeting at the World Trade Centre on 8 June 1993, and has met regularly since that date in order to complete its work within the prescribed 6-week period. It should be stated at the outset that the Commission has faced a daunting task in attempting to establish an open and accessible process within very tight time constraints. Similar exercises in other countries have been carried out over substantially longer periods of time.

The Commission is also aware that it has been functioning within a volatile political environment, which has heightened sensitivity around regional boundary issues. It is hoped, therefore, that the recommendations and work of the Commission, carried out within the brief received from the Negotiating Council, will assist in addressing some of the problems that exist in relation to the issue of SPR's.

### **2. Brief of the Commission**

At its meeting of 28 May 1993 the Negotiating Council gave a brief to the Commission to make recommendations on the demarcation of SPR's in South Africa, realising that regional boundaries will be relevant to the electoral process, as well as to the structures of the Constitution. The factors that the Commission was briefed to take into account are listed in the annexured resolution. It should be noted that the question of structures, powers and functions of SPR's is not included in the Commission's Terms of Reference, but is assigned to the Technical Committee on Constitutional Issues.

The Commission was furthermore mandated to "hear representations from the public at large and from different areas of the country". In addition it was to "allow interested parties and persons to submit their views within a specific period, which should not be less than one month after an invitation in this regard has been published."

The Commission was also mandated to take cognisance of any material it might wish to collect and of any progress made in the Negotiating Council by way of agreements on constitutional matters.

### **3. Working procedure of the Commission**

The Commission decided to embark on its investigation by means of the following three stage process:

#### **3.1 The first stage of the Commission's work: The gathering of information and hearing of evidence**

- (i) An urgent decision that had to be taken by the Commission related to the publication of invitations to interested parties and persons to submit evidence to the Commission. It was decided that this be done through the media, both printed and electronic, as well as through the participants in the Multi-Party Negotiating Process.
- (ii) A second decision was required about the form of the submissions so tendered. It was decided that this should principally be in writing, but that parties and persons should be free to apply to make an oral submission to the Commission.
- (iii) Given the issues at stake, it was further decided that the Commission receives submissions and hears evidence at the World Trade Centre and other parts of South Africa. Following an evaluation of the areas from which requests for oral submissions had been received, sittings of the Commission were arranged in the following centres:

- \* Cape Town
- \* Port Elizabeth
- \* Durban
- \* Umzimkulu

#### **3.2 The second stage of the Commission's work: The processing of evidence**

In the second stage, the Commission (and the Technical Support Team appointed by the Commission) processed the information that had been gathered. During this stage several reports were produced by the Technical Support Team, which assisted the Commission in assessing the proposals.

#### **3.3 The third stage of the Commission's work: The preparation of the final report**

The final stage of the Commission's work consisted of the finalisation of its recommendations and the preparation of a report to the Negotiating Council.



#### **4. Support staff involved**

Given the technical nature of the Commission's work, it was decided that a distinction should be made between two categories of support staff:

- \* Administrative and secretarial support staff provided by the Administration of the Multi-Party Negotiating Process.
- \* Technical support staff with knowledge and expertise required to support the Commission in its task. These persons were drawn from amongst professional people, and were appointed on recommendation of the Commission to assist with specific aspects of the work.



## **CHAPTER 2**

### **AGREEMENTS ON REGIONAL GOVERNMENT BY THE NEGOTIATING COUNCIL**

#### **1. Introduction**

In approaching its task, the Commission has made certain general assumptions based on the criteria provided in its terms of reference, and the constitutional principles recommended to the Negotiating Forum by the Negotiating Council to guide the Commission's work.

The Commission did not try to predetermine the appropriate number of SPR's to be demarcated, nor their size. Rather, it sought to obtain guidance on these issues through an examination of the submissions received, the application of the criteria provided, and the Constitutional Principles agreed upon by the Negotiation Council.

#### **2. Criteria for the Demarcation/Delimitation of SPR's**

The Commission was instructed to take into account the following criteria:  
(For the Commission's approach to these criteria see Chapter 3)

- 2.1 Historical boundaries, including provincial, magisterial and district boundaries and infrastructure;
- 2.2 Administrative considerations including the availability or non-availability of infrastructures and nodal points for services;
- 2.3 The need or otherwise to rationalise existing structures (including TBVC States, self-governing and regional governments);
- 2.4 The necessity of limiting financial and other costs as much as is reasonably possible;
- 2.5 The need to minimise inconvenience to the people;
- 2.6 The need to minimise the dislocation of services;
- 2.7 Demographic considerations;
- 2.8 Economic viability;
- 2.9 Development potential; and

2.10 Cultural and language realities.

### 3. Constitutional Principles

With regard to the Constitutional Principles recommended by the Negotiating Council to the Negotiating Forum on 2 July 1993, the ones listed below were considered to be particularly pertinent.

- 3.1 "The Constitution of South Africa shall provide for the establishment of one sovereign state with a democratic system of government a common South African citizenship and a democratic system of government committed to achieving equality between men and women and people of all races."
- 3.2 "The Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land, shall be binding on organs of government, shall prohibit racial, gender and all other forms of discrimination and promote racial and gender equality and national unity."
- 3.3 "There shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness."
- 3.4 "Government shall be structured at national, SPR (states, provinces, regions) and local levels."
- 3.5 "At each level of government there shall be democratic representation ...."
- 3.6 "Each level of government shall have appropriate and adequate legislative and executive powers and functions that will enable each level to function effectively. The allocation of powers between different levels of government shall be made on a basis which is conducive to financial viability at each level of government and to effective public administration, and which promotes national unity, legitimate regional autonomy and cultural diversity."
- 3.7 "The powers and functions of the national and SPR levels of government shall include exclusive and concurrent powers as well as the power to perform functions for other levels of government on an agency or delegation basis."
- 3.8 "National and SPR governments shall have fiscal powers and functions which will be defined in the Constitution."
- 3.9 "Each level of government shall have a constitutional right to an equitable share of revenue collected nationally so as to ensure that SPR's and local governments are able to provide basic services and execute the functions allocated to them in the Constitution."
- 3.10 "A Financial and Fiscal Commission, representing *inter alia* each of the



SPR's, shall recommend fiscal and financial allocations to the SPR governments from revenue collected nationally, after taking into account the national interest, disparities within the SPR's as well as the population and developmental needs, administrative responsibilities and other legitimate interests of each of the SPR's."

- 3.11 "The following criteria shall be applied in the allocation of powers to the national government and the SPR governments:..."
- 3.12 "The national government shall not exercise its powers (exclusive or concurrent) so as to encroach upon the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of the SPR's."
- 3.13 "Where it is necessary for the maintenance of essential national standards, the maintenance of economic unity, the maintenance of national security or the prevention of unreasonable action taken by one SPR which is prejudicial to the interests of another SPR or the country as a whole, the constitution shall empower the national government to intervene through legislation or such other steps as may be defined in the constitution."
- 3.14 "The essential principles of the constitution including the fundamental rights contained therein shall apply to all organs of the state at all levels of government."

#### **National government**

- 3.15 "Where there is necessity for South Africa to speak with one voice, or to act as a single entity - in particular in relation to other states - powers should be allocated to the national government."
- 3.16 "Where uniformity across the nation is required for a particular function, then legislative power over that function should be allocated predominantly, if not wholly, to the national government."
- 3.17 "Where minimum standards across the nation are required for the delivery of public services, the power to set such standards should be allocated to the national government."
- 3.18 "The determination of national economic policies, and the power to promote inter-SPR commerce and protect the common market in respect of the mobility of goods, services, capital and labour, should be allocated to the national government."



## **SPR government**

- 3.19 "SPR governments shall have such powers, either exclusively or concurrently with the national government, as may be necessary, *inter alia*, for the purpose of regional planning and development, and the delivery of services and aspects of health, welfare and education, within their boundaries.

It was agreed that the Technical Committee reformulate this principle."

## **Concurrent powers**

- 3.20 "Where mutual co-operation is essential or desirable or where it is required to guarantee equality of opportunity or access to a government service, the powers should be allocated concurrently to the national government and the SPR governments."
- 3.21 "In the event of a dispute concerning the legislative powers allocated by the Constitution concurrently to the national and SPR governments which cannot be resolved by a court on a construction of the Constitution, precedence shall be given to the legislative powers of the national government."

## **Residual powers**

- 3.22 "The Constitution shall specify how powers which are not specifically allocated in the constitution to the national government or to an SPR government, shall be dealt with as necessary ancillary powers pertaining to the powers and functions allocated either to the national or SPR governments."

## **SPR's**

- 3.23 "That the powers, functions and structures of regions for the transition period shall be incorporated in the Constitution for the transition period."
- 3.24 "That the election of Regional Legislatures and the establishment of Regional Governments in the transitional period shall be provided for in the Constitution for the transitional period."

## **Constitution for the transition period and the Constitution-Making Body**

"That the Technical Committee shall draft a constitution for the transition period which shall make provision for:"

- 3.25 "The election according to a system of proportional representation of a Constitution-Making Body, legislature and national government for the transitional phase which will include a national and regional component. With regard to constitution making, this Constitution shall provide for dead-lock breaking and special majorities by which decisions will be taken;"
- 3.26 "The election of regional legislatures and the establishment of regional governments in the transitional period;"
- 3.27 "The powers, functions and structures of regions for the transitional period;"
- 3.28 "Fundamental human rights on a justiciable basis during the transitional period;"
- 3.29 "A constitutional Court/Tribunal to ensure the justiciability of the Constitutional Principles, of the fundamental rights and of the Constitution itself."

## **4. Overarching National Concerns**

There are three overarching national concerns, pertaining to the formation and demarcation of SPR's, which the Commission considered important:

- \* The need to fashion a democratic culture by bringing government closer to the people;
- \* The need to create an environment that is conducive for economic growth and development; and
- \* The need to build one nation through the acknowledgment of diversity and the reduction of conflict.

## 5. Assumptions.

Based on all the above, there are some assumptions underpinning the discussions and recommendations that the Commission arrived at. These assumptions are as follows:

- \* That South Africa will be one sovereign state with a democratic system of government committed to achieving equality between men and women and people of all races.
- \* That there will be strong SPR governments with legislative and executive powers.
- \* That there will be a free flow of goods, services, labour and capital across SPR boundaries.



## CHAPTER 3

# INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE ON THE DEMARCATION OF REGIONS

### 1. Introduction

The unique circumstances of various countries make it very difficult, if not virtually impossible, to formulate rigid and fixed norms and principles upon which the demarcation of regions should be based. Various countries with regional-type dispensations have approached demarcation from their own historical background and circumstances, rather than from a standard set of universally applicable rules. South Africa also has to approach the process of demarcation with its own particular circumstances in mind and apply international lessons creatively to local problems. The unique circumstances of the respective countries do not mean that South Africa cannot learn any lessons from their experience. On the contrary, South Africa can take cognizance of the successes and failures of other countries in their efforts to find a successful formula for demarcation.

There are four areas in particular where South Africans can benefit from international experience, namely the **process** of demarcation, the **criteria** for demarcation, the weight or **value** attached to the respective criteria and subsequent **alterations** of regional boundaries. Although it was not the purpose of the Commission to launch a full investigation into international experiences concerning these matters, it did take cognizance of the following:

### 2. Process of demarcation

The process of demarcation is of crucial importance, especially in a unitary country with no generally accepted regional boundaries. In countries such as the United States, Canada and Australia where historical states embarked upon a process of forming a closer union, the demarcation of regions was never as contested an issue as in countries where regions had to be demarcated anew. However, in Switzerland with its long history of cantonal government, the issue of demarcation of half-cantons went hand in hand with intense emotion and conflict. As a general rule, in the traditional federal-type dispensations with strong historically rooted regions, any amendment or alteration of regional boundaries has to be preceded by an extensive process of investigation, consultation and legislative procedures. The history of various regional and federal-type dispensations show an inclination to reshape boundaries from time to time in order to improve the operation of the system and especially to meet the demands of local cultural, economic and other groups.

The process of demarcation in countries that have moved from a highly centralized to a more decentralized regional-type dispensation, has been far more controversial than in countries with generally accepted historical boundaries and regions. The experience of countries such as India, Germany, Nigeria, Spain and Italy illustrates the importance of the process leading up to the actual demarcation of regions. In these and other countries with similar



experiences, ample provision was made to involve the public in the process of demarcation and to employ expertise. The role of the media and the work of demarcation commissions in an inclusive demarcation process has proved pivotal in these countries.

The South African Commission on Demarcation wishes to highlight the following lessons from international experience on the **process** of demarcation:

- 2.1 The process of demarcation should be as inclusive as possible, to allow a wide range of interested parties and groups enough time and opportunity to make submissions.
- 2.2 The process should be facilitated by a demarcation commission consisting of a legitimate group of experts. The appointment of a demarcation commission could remove the matter from the political arena, involve civil and political society in the process, and ensure that the various criteria are applied in a balanced manner.
- 2.3 The process is in many cases as important as its eventual outcome. If interest groups feel that the process has not been sufficiently inclusive, the outcome may be rejected, which could lead to conflict and instability. Any future alteration of boundaries in South Africa should preferably be preceded by an acceptable process.
- 2.4 The process of demarcation could encourage and even compel various parties, interest groups and communities to co-operate at a regional level, discuss options and where possible present a common position.

### **3. Criteria for demarcation**

The criteria for demarcating regions are of cardinal importance in ensuring a balanced and acceptable outcome. There are various approaches to the identification of criteria for demarcation. In some cases the constitution contains the criteria that have to be applied, while in others the criteria are identified by statutory or *ad hoc* provisions as the need for demarcation arises.

A crucial question not only to South Africans but also to other countries facing the issue of demarcation, is what criteria should be included in the constitution or statutes. Various countries have, depending on their circumstances, identified different criteria on which demarcation ought to be based. Some have emphasized the importance of historical regions (e.g. the USA, Canada and Australia), others the role of language and culture (e.g. India, Nigeria and Belgium), while yet others have tried to achieve a balance between national and emotional criteria (i.e. Germany, Spain, Italy). It would seem from an overview of various countries, that the following criteria could be used as a general guideline for demarcation:

- 3.1 Historical matters such as
  - \* historical regions and local governments
  - \* the spontaneous development of communities
  - \* traditional authorities



- 3.2 Language and culture such as
  - \* language, religion and cultural formations
  - \* intercultural conflict and/or co-operation
  - \* migration patterns
- 3.3 Economic considerations such as
  - \* economic functions
  - \* resources and viability
  - \* economic dependencies
- 3.4 Institutional capacity such as
  - \* technical, administrative and professional know-how
  - \* political institutions and structures
  - \* management capacity
- 3.5 Natural and physical features such as
  - \* rivers, mountains
  - \* catchment areas
  - \* environmental considerations

#### **4. Value or weight of respective criteria**

The logical question arising from the identification of criteria for demarcation concerns the relative weight and value attached to the respective criteria. The natural inclination of interest groups is to overemphasize the importance of some criteria and to underplay the importance of others.

International experience and the requirements of the South African situation indicate the need for a balanced application of the respective criteria. Under certain circumstances, in certain towns, villages or communities, some criteria may be relatively more important, whereas in other cases, economic or language considerations may prove decisive. On balance however, the criteria should be applied equitably.

The South African situation in particular requires a balanced rational application of demarcation criteria. The overemphasis of certain criteria may plunge the whole process and its outcome into an acceptability and legitimacy crisis. International experience has shown that an overemphasis on language and cultural homogeneity may lead to the creation of non-viable regions, to duplication and interregional ethnic conflict. On the other hand, an overemphasis on economic and other national criteria may lead to the creation of regions that are too large to manage properly. Such regions may not share an adequate sense of belonging and regional identity, because they contain too many competing ethnic groups. It must be stressed that regions in which diversities in terms of language and cultural matters occur are usually not segregated so precisely that political boundaries could mark off completely homogeneous units.



The Commission has taken note of the experiences of various countries in demarcation. While keeping in mind South Africa's unique circumstances, the following general guidelines were identified from international experience regarding the value or weight attached to the respective criteria:

- 4.1 The criteria should be applied in a balanced manner to prevent a skewed picture from developing, in which certain criteria are overemphasized to the detriment of others. It may, however, in certain circumstances be necessary to highlight a particular criterion in order to decide the fate of a particular community.
- 4.2 In many of the countries analyzed, historical and language factors played a crucial role in demarcation. In some cases this was the logical consequence of historical patterns of living and government, while in others it led to the creation of regions and their alteration. Two remarks can be made about historical and language criteria. Firstly it should be stressed that "historical" criteria are only relevant to the extent that people regard regions as having historical significance. Secondly, as regards language criteria, it seems that regions should not be "gerrymandered" at the cost of geographical and economic cohesion merely for the sake of language homogeneity. The reorganization of homogeneous language and cultural regions may provide the opportunity for the exploiting of ethnic sentiments, claims and counter-claims, and constant new majorities and new minorities. On the other hand, regional boundaries should not cut across the spontaneously formed areas where particular language communities live.
- 4.3 There are circumstances in which metropolitan areas can fall in more than one regional. However, demarcation should, as far as possible, not cut across or separate highly urbanized and economically integrated regions where interdependency exists. In particular, regional boundaries should not divide highly industrialized areas, nor should they separate areas where people work from the corresponding residential areas. Metropolitan regions should not be too narrowly divided because inflexible boundaries may create difficulties when it comes to expansion, further development and urbanization.
- 4.4 International experience makes it difficult to identify an "ideal" number of regions for a given country. There are too many factors influencing the number of regions, making it basically impossible to justify a theoretically fixed number of regions. Based on international experience the following are but a few of the factors that have had an impact on the number of regions in various countries: historical regions (e.g. the USA, Canada and Switzerland), language diversity (e.g. Nigeria and Belgium), the size of the population and country (e.g. India and Brazil) and a combination of historical and economic considerations (e.g. Germany and Spain). The absolute **minimum** number of regions seems to be five or more. Fewer regions might encourage the dominance of one over the others (e.g. Nigeria with three regions in 1960); might lead to constant outvoting (e.g. difficulties experienced in Belgium) or to permanent voting blocs. The **maximum** number of regions is even more difficult to determine objectively, especially when one considers how many countries have between 10 and 50 regions. The Commission wishes to emphasize that, given the



South African situation, a balanced application of the respective criteria could prevent the establishment of an excessive number of regions.

## **5. Alteration of regional boundaries**

Most countries, especially those that do not have a long history of regional government, provide that if certain conditions are met, regional boundaries may be altered, amended or adjusted. In countries with a long history of regional government and undisputed regional boundaries, such as the United States of America, Australia and Canada, there has been little need to alter boundaries. However, even in a country with more than seven centuries of regional government such as Switzerland, there have been various successful efforts to alter cantonal boundaries by creating half-cantons.

In countries with fairly recent experience of regional government, such as India, Nigeria, Spain, Italy and Namibia, there is a more apparent need to provide for boundaries to be altered from time to time. The reasons for the alteration of boundaries may differ depending on each country's circumstances. In India and Nigeria, for instance, none of the regions remained unaffected by the efforts to redemarcate regions along linguistic lines. In Nigeria this has led to instability and uncertainty in that a virtually continuous process of redemarcation began in an effort to grant each minority its own region. In Germany there have been two demarcation efforts since the present constitution was promulgated and there is currently discussion on the appointment of a third demarcation commission which would, among other things, evaluate the success of the demarcation of the Eastern regionals.

The requirements for altering boundaries differ in the various countries. Normally the alteration of boundaries is not a matter for the central legislature alone. There is a variety of prerequisites and the following are but a few examples: investigation by a demarcation commission, public involvement and consultation, referenda among the affected populations, inputs from the regional legislatures, increased majorities, and special procedures by the central legislature.

It goes without saying that the alteration of regional boundaries also has to be approached in a balanced manner. Constantly changing boundaries may be worse and lead to greater insecurity than having no alterations at all. The dominance of emotional over rational and economic considerations may fuel intraregional and interregional instability, and may discourage the inhabitants of regions from developing closer ties, a common loyalty and a sense of belonging to a particular region.

The Commission would therefore, given the variety of experiences that countries have had in the alteration of boundaries, highlight the following guidelines:

- 5.1 Most countries provide for regional boundaries to be altered if certain requirements are fulfilled.
- 5.2 A balance should be achieved between altering the boundaries and encouraging regional inhabitants to develop a common understanding and destiny.



- 5.3 The requirements for the alteration of boundaries generally include not only popular involvement but also technical expertise.
- 5.4 The alteration of regions in countries with a shorter history of regional demarcation, may be easier than in cases where regional government has become a permanent and historic feature.

## CHAPTER 4

### CRITERIA FOR THE DEMARCATION/DELIMITATION OF SPR'S

#### 1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a framework for considering the criteria for the demarcation of SPR's , provided as a terms of reference for the Commission. The discussion of the criteria is undertaken in the context of the consensus reached by the Commission members that the boundaries demarcated/delimited must make sense in terms of economic aspects, institutional and administrative capacity, geographical coherence, and socio-cultural dimensions.

#### 2. On the concept of "Region."

A region may be defined as a geographic area which has evolved a social, economic and/or political milieu which distinguishes it from some other sub-national areas. An area can be considered a region due to economic functionality, for administrative purposes or because of its homogeneity.

An **economically functional region** exists when the level of interaction of components of the economy within an area is significant as compared with other places.

**Homogenous regions** are characterised by internal similarity based on common activities, such as culture, climate, or even level of economic development.

Regions are often formed for the exercise of particular **administrative, legislative, and judicial functions**. Unlike either functional or homogenous regions, such regions are usually more clearly delineated. Nonetheless, such regions may not be distinct from homogeneous or functional regions . Furthermore, the creation of an administrative region may itself foster homogeneity and functionality to emerge within an area.

The three different types of regions discussed above can occur at both the national and international level.



### **3. Criteria for the Demarcation/Delimitation of SPR's**

The key question in the demarcation of SPR's pertains to the appropriate criteria to use. At its meeting of June 12, 1993, the Commission grouped the ten criteria provided, in the terms of reference, into categories in order to develop a framework for their application.

The following are the ten criteria provided as part of the Commission's brief.

- 3.1 Historical boundaries, including provincial, magisterial and district boundaries and infrastructures;
- 3.2 Administrative considerations including the availability or non-availability of infrastructures and nodal points for services;
- 3.3 The need or otherwise to rationalise existing structures (including the TBVC States, self-governing territories and regional governments);
- 3.4 The necessity of limiting financial and other costs as much as is reasonably possible;
- 3.5 The need to minimise inconvenience to the people;
- 3.6 The need to minimise the dislocation of services;
- 3.7 Demographic considerations;
- 3.8 Economic viability;
- 3.9 Development potential; and
- 3.10 Cultural and language realities.

The above criteria were categorised into four broad groups, namely:

- A. Economic Aspects - (criteria (3.4-3.6), and (3.9) )
- B. Geographic Coherence (criterion (3.1) )
- C. Institutional and Administrative Capacity ( criteria (3.2-3.6))
- D. Socio-Cultural Issues (criteria (3.7 and 3.10))

### **3.1 ECONOMIC ASPECTS**

Several dimensions have been identified as critical to consider as part of the Economic criterion. These are, economic functionality, economic viability, fiscal capacity, development potential, and infrastructure (social and physical). Given the challenges facing South Africa, the overriding concerns with regard to this criterion are economic growth and development. That is, that the regions demarcated/delimited must contribute to meeting these concerns.

#### **3.1.1 Economic functionality**

The notion of economic functionality refers to a situation whereby the level of interaction of components within a region is significant compared with other places. An economically functional region could take many forms. For example, nodal regions have a centre of concentrated economic activity which serves other sub-centres or residential areas. The functionality of region is measured by the flow of goods and services, labour flows, and to an extent by the market areas for the local production sector. Therefore, economic functionality is related to the activities that occur around an urban core and the extent of its impact on the welfare of its hinterland.

#### **3.1.2 Economic Viability**

Economic viability relates to the extent to which a particular region has an adequate resource base to provide for the welfare of its population. This includes an economic base to provide jobs, produce goods and services and a sufficient tax base to provide fiscal capacity. With respect to fiscal capacity, economically viable regions generally also have the capability to generate a significant tax base.

It is important to note several issues with regard to the questions of economic functionality and viability. First, economic functionality is a necessary but not sufficient condition for economic viability. In short, an economically functional region is not necessarily economically viable in all respects, particularly in terms of tax base. Second, it is not possible in the demarcation of regions to create regions which are equal in terms of economic viability because this may in fact interfere with their functionality. Finally, having economically functional regions has the potential of nurturing economic viability in the future. Therefore, everything equal, economic functionality should be considered as a critical criterion for the demarcation of SPR's; however this does not mean that economic viability should not be taken into account.



The question of economic viability as it relates to the fiscal capacity of SPR's is also important given the recommendations of the Negotiating Council to the Negotiating Forum on constitutional principles<sup>1</sup>.

### 3.1.3 Infrastructure

Infrastructure is an important factor in determining the economic functionality and development potential of an area. In this regard both physical and social infrastructure needs to be considered.

**Physical infrastructure** includes, transport, energy, and telecommunications. Physical infrastructure is critical to development and economic functionality because it impacts on production and consumption costs. In many cases the cost of particular aspects of infrastructure are factored into the price of inputs and those of final goods and services. For example, energy is often part of the cost of production and transportation directly impacts on the cost of distribution of goods and by implication on the price of the final good. The major issues to be considered in the demarcation of SPR's is both the amount of infrastructure that exists and how effective and efficient it is in promoting intra- and interregional linkages.

Other than its impact on economic viability and functionality, physical infrastructure also impacts on the quality of life of citizens because it has a direct effect on access to services (e.g., transport) and information (e.g. energy and telecommunications).

**Social infrastructure** includes health, housing, education and social welfare facilities, and their relative accessibility to the regional population. Social infrastructure impacts on the quality of life of the regional population. Particular aspects of social infrastructure, especially

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<sup>1</sup> The following principles are important in this regard.

- 2.17 *Each level of government shall have appropriate and adequate legislative and executive powers and function that will enable each level to function effectively. The allocation of powers between different levels of government shall be made on a basis which is conducive to financial viability at each level of government and to effective public administration, and which promotes national unity, legitimate regional autonomy and cultural diversity.*
- 2.21 *National and SPR governments shall have fiscal powers and functions which will be defined in the Constitution. The framework for local governments referred to in paragraph 2.19 shall make provision for appropriate fiscal powers and functions for different categories of local government.*
- 2.23 *A Financial and Fiscal Commission, representing inter alia each of the SPR's shall recommend equitable fiscal and financial allocations to the SPR governments from revenue collected nationally after taking into account the national interest, disparities within the SPR's as well as the population and development needs, administrative responsibilities and other legitimate interest of each of the SPR's.*



health and education, affect the quality of human capital a region has and hence its economic viability and development potential.

While it may not be possible to equalise infrastructure among different SPR's, there is a need to assess what capacity exists and how existing gaps could be met through a sharing of inter-regional capacity. Furthermore, in applying this criterion, the effect of the status quo and past policies on the orientation of infrastructure needs to be taken into account.

### **3.1.4 Development Potential.**

The goal of development is to improve the quality of life or standard of living of the population. One aspect of development is economic growth. Another dimension of development is the transformation of socio-economic and political institutions so that they contribute towards the growth and self-determination of communities. Given this, the issues of economic functionality, economic viability and infrastructure are clearly important components in determining the development potential of an area. Furthermore, it is clear that other dimensions to be dealt with later, particularly institutional and administrative capacity, are also important.

In considering the development potential of SPR's, one needs to take into account at least two issues. The first is the existing development needs as indicated by current socio-economic indicators. A second, is the economic viability of particular regional economies in the context of both national and international trends. That is, regions that are currently leading in terms of economic growth and development, may not necessarily be so in the future given their economic structure and comparative advantage. Therefore, development potential has to be looked at in terms of both a national and international context.

## **3.2 INSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY.**

As indicated above, regions can exist for managerial and administrative purposes. The institutional and administrative capacity of the region ultimately determines their effectiveness, efficiency and performance of tasks in an accountable manner. This has direct bearing on the quality of goods and services that will be provided to regional populations as well as the calibre of governance.

**Institutional and administrative capacity** refers to the existence of workable structures and systems to execute governmental functions and provide the necessary public goods and social services. Thus, it relates not only to structures of governance, but also to institutions for the provision and management of social and physical infrastructure.

In addition, institutional capacity concerns the degree to which appropriate policy formulation, implementation, monitoring and planning of the region's development can be undertaken.



With regard to **administration**, international experience demonstrates that the evolution of appropriate bureaucracies to meet regional needs, is a long term process which requires systematic intervention and planning. Therefore, the nature of the existing capacity, particularly within the civil service structure, its possible configuration and rationalisation under a new constitutional dispensation, and the long term potential of regions to develop the necessary capacity, have to be considered. Furthermore, due consideration has to be given to minimising inconvenience to the people and the dislocation of services being rendered.

Finally, the issues of administrative and institutional capacity indicated above have fiscal implications. Therefore, the cost of governance and administration of an SPR needs to be taken into account when demarcating/delimiting regions. A balance has to be maintained between the benefits to be gained from economies of scale, and the costs that will be incurred by individuals using the SPR administrative and governmental structures, as they increase in size and complexity.

### **3.3 GEOGRAPHICAL COHERENCE**

In this report, geographical coherence pertains to the idea that SPR's must be compact and exhibit a high level of functional linkages between localities. This criterion is all the more important in relation to the history of South Africa and the creation of disjointed homeland territories.

### **3.4 SOCIO-CULTURAL ISSUES**

The issues that have been identified is essential to consider in this regard are, a sense of identity with the region, historical boundaries, and language and cultural considerations.

#### **3.4.1 Sense of Identity and Historical Boundaries**

As currently categorised, sense of regional identity is related to socio-cultural dimensions. However, it is important to note that sense of identity is a multifaceted concept in that it can be the result of social, cultural, political, geographic or economic factors. It is therefore important to balance these various dimensions in the demarcation of SPR's.

Related to a sense of regional identity, is the question of the role of historical boundaries in the delimitation of new SPR boundaries. The existing provincial boundaries in particular, have created a certain sense of identity and provide a useful starting point for the examination of the boundary issue. Existing boundaries which are not unduly tainted by the recent apartheid past take on an even greater relevance where the delimitation process has to take place within a short period. On a smaller scale as well, the existing magisterial districts are useful for the construction of a regional framework.

A further issue to be considered under historical boundaries is that of disputed land rights. Given the history of South Africa, along any boundary that is demarcated for the purpose of the establishment of SPR's, there is the potential of land claims being made by one party or another. The resolution of such claims can have an impact on demarcation.

### **3.4.2 Language and Culture Considerations**

There are two elements that need to be highlighted with regard to this issue. The first is the need for sensitivity toward sense of identity (however defined) without creating preconditions that may lead to problems of discrimination against minority interests and/or ethnic cleansing. Second, a clear understanding of what the objective of considering this particular criterion is, needs to be stated. Although SPR's should not be demarcated along language lines only, geographical areas with obvious homogenous linguistic patterns should be taken into account, particularly where language is an important component of regional educational policy.

## **4. Conclusion**

The above discussion has tried to highlight the key issues relating to the given criteria for the demarcation of SPR's. It is safe to surmise that the Commission would have to maintain a flexible framework in its deliberations. Certain criteria could be seen as carrying weight because of overarching national goals, such as economic growth, development and the creation of a democratic culture, facing the country. In other cases, the weight of criteria could differ depending on the case under consideration.



## **CHAPTER 5**

### **RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE DEMARCATION/DELIMITATION OF SPR'S**

#### **1. Introduction**

The objective of this chapter is to give a perspective on submissions received by the Commission on the Demarcation/Delimitation of SPR's, present the methodology and framework for analysis which was followed in evaluating and applying criteria for demarcation/delimitation, and to make recommendations on the delimitation of regions.

The recommendations on the demarcation of boundaries as discussed in this chapter should be seen in the context of related issues discussed in other parts of the report.

#### **2. Perspective on Submissions Received**

The Commission issued a media statement on June 8, 1993 inviting all interested individuals, parties and interested groups to make written and/or oral submissions on the demarcation of regions.

Despite the short time that was available for submissions to be made, the Commission received three hundred and four (304) written submissions and heard a total of eighty (80) oral presentations at various centres around the country. The Commission was generally impressed with the high standard of submissions, especially given the limited time available for the preparation of submissions.

The Commission was concerned about the inadequacy of local community involvement in the process. This was due to a number of factors such as:

- (i) the limited time that was allowed;
- (ii) the lack of capacity of many communities to respond, either orally or in written form; and
- (iii) the limited number of people and organisations that the notification of the Commission's brief was able to reach.

A list of those individuals and organisations who made written and/or oral submissions to the Commission is attached in the appendix.

It was noticeable that many presentations used the criteria provided by the Negotiating Council in order to argue their case. This approach has facilitated a rational rather than an

emotional process. Several submissions, especially those of a technical nature, recommended to the Commission that issues not necessarily pertinently expressed in the Commission's criteria be taken into account. These included environmental concerns, development considerations, and technical issues. These considerations enriched the understanding of the Commission regarding dimensions that had to be considered in the demarcation.

In addition to the above, the Commission observed that a significant number of submissions used the nine development regions as a point of departure. This facilitated a practical framework for analysis which is discussed below. An interesting aspect however is that no submissions actually argued in favour of the continuation of the development region's in their present form. All submissions to a greater or lesser extent proposed some alterations to the development regions.

### 3. Framework for Analysis

In order to develop a framework for analysis, the Commission used as a point of departure the nine development regions. The Commission does not in any way intend to propagate or favour a view that these regions constitute the **only** framework for analysis. Rather, this approach was used as an analytical tool to identify pertinent areas of consensus and dispute in the submissions.

Once the key areas of consensus and dispute were identified, they were categorised into **regional, subregional and local issues**.

- \* **regional issues** - those which concern the demarcation of a region as a whole. In other words, where a development region, as a point of departure, is in dispute.
- \* **Subregional issues** - those which concern the inclusion or exclusion of a subregional area in a particular region.
- \* **Local issues** - those which concern the inclusion or exclusion of a magisterial district, city or town in one region or another.

This framework for analysis, together with the criteria for demarcation, was then used in evaluating the submission received.

In gathering and analysing the respective submissions the Commission and its technical support team approached the issue in the following way:

- \* The net was cast as wide as possible to enable interested parties, groups and individuals to make proposals and submissions to the Commission. The Commission also visited certain communities (i.e. Umzimkulu) in order to obtain further information.
- \* The Commission reorganised the criteria provided by the Negotiating Council



in order to ensure as complete as possible an analysis.

- \* The respective criteria were used by the Commission to evaluate the proposals received in a balanced way. The Commission was well aware that given the South African and international experience, the overemphasis of a particular criterion could lead to a skewed picture. (See Chapter 4 on criteria). Consequently the various submissions were analyzed on the basis of (a) institutional and administrative capacity, (b) economic and infrastructural considerations, (c) socio-cultural issues and (d) geographical considerations.
- \* After consideration of the above, the Commission formulated its recommendations as discussed below.

## **4. Recommendations on the Demarcation/Delimitation of SPR's.**

### **4.0 Introduction**

The Commission was, due to the short time that was given to it, not able to investigate all local disputes regarding the position of particular towns or communities. It may therefore be necessary to further investigate certain problem areas, to hear evidence and to pay visits to the affected communities in order to elicit further views and recommendations.

The importance of "soft boundaries" has been stressed by various submissions. The Commission views the importance of such soft boundaries within the following two perspectives. Firstly, provision should be made for regional boundaries to be amended or altered before they are finalized in order to ensure that sufficient agreement exists regarding the particular demarcation. This applies particularly to some of the local areas which are still in dispute. According to lessons of the international experience provision needs to be made for alterations of boundaries according to procedures provided for in the constitution. The second aspect of soft boundaries has to do with the importance that regional boundaries should not unduly affect the free flow of individuals, traffic, goods, capital and services.

The Commission noted a number of submissions that referred to the possibility of subregional arrangements. It is not clear yet what is intended or envisaged by such subregional arrangements and consequently it requires further investigation. The Commission is of the opinion that the diversity as well as particular development needs of local communities should be given consideration.

The Commission received various proposals for some form of Volkstaat. Three main areas were identified in submissions as the basis for such a region. The Commission noted that no agreement on the demarcation of a Volkstaat could be reached between the parties favouring such a region. The Commission has, as with all other submissions, applied the criteria in a balanced way in the evaluation of the various Volkstaat proposals.

The following comprises a region by region discussion of the recommendations of the Commission and a summary of the application of criteria.

#### **4.1 NORTHERN TRANSVAAL**

##### **4.1.1 Recommendation**

The Commission recommends (with one dissension) the demarcation of the Northern Transvaal as indicated on the accompanying map.

##### **4.1.2 Summary of application of criteria**

###### **Economic Aspects**

Although two functional economic units can be distinguished in this area (ie. the magisterial districts of Ellisras, Thabazimbi, Waterberg and a portion of Warmbad on the one hand, and the rest of the region with Pietersburg as its nodal point on the other), these two units when combined enhance the economic functionality of the region as a whole, vis-a-vis other neighbouring region's. In spite of the region being relatively poorly off in terms of its lower than average Gross Geographic Product (GGP) per capita, economic resource base and quality of life indicators, it can function as an entity.

###### **Institutional and Administrative Capacity**

There is generally adequate administrative and institutional capacity in the region to undertake governmental responsibilities as well as to plan, implement and manage development. However, the need for the rationalisation and integration of existing institutional structures is apparent.

Training facilities, such as universities and technical institutions, which could assist in the development of human resource capacities, exist in the Northern Transvaal.

Management capacities vary widely within the governmental and non-governmental sectors. Cooperation and planning arrangements between the public and the non-governmental sector can be improved in order to increase institutional and administrative capacity.



The recommended demarcation provides adequate opportunity for the integration, rationalisation and maximization of available institutional capacities of, inter alia, regional institutions such as the Transvaal Provincial Authority (PTA), and the Venda, Gazankulu and Lebowa administrations.

### **Socio-Cultural Aspects**

The region is characterised by a heterogenous composition of population in terms of language, cultural and racial sub-divisions. In spite of the heterogenous nature of the Northern Transvaal population, a certain sense of regional identity exists which distinguishes this region from neighbouring areas.

### **Geographical Coherence**

In terms of its compact shape, the Northern Transvaal region forms a geographically coherent entity. Given the fragmented nature of current homeland boundaries, the recommended demarcation will substantially improve the geographical coherence and compactness of the region.

It can be observed that in terms of urban-rural linkages a fair balance of larger and smaller towns exist which act as service centres to the surrounding rural areas.

## **4.2 PRETORIA-WITWATERSRAND-VEREENIGING (PWV)**

### **4.2.1 Recommendation**

The Commission reached a majority decision (with 2 dissensions) on the establishment of the PWV as a region. The Commission thus recommends that the PWV be demarcated as indicated in the accompanying map.

### **4.2.2 Summary of application of criteria**

#### **Economic Aspects**

The PWV is a compact, developed and highly integrated urban-industrial complex that should be retained as such. As a unit, the PWV is an economically functional interdependent area.

While the subregional economies of the PWV may differ in structure, they are complementary and demonstrate a continuum from primary to tertiary sectors. The Vaal Triangle economy is dominated by manufacturing, while the Central

Witwatersrand economy is dominated by the manufacturing and financial sectors with mining capital playing an important intersectoral linkage. The Pretoria subregional economy is dominated by government services, transport and related industries, as well as high-technology industries such as electronics and defence related products. Thus the emerging linkage between the Central Witwatersrand area and Pretoria, as a result of the development strip extending from the Sandton Municipality through Midrand, is in fact an indication of the complementarity of the two areas. The strong linkages within the PWV are also demonstrated by commuting patterns between the subregional areas. Sasolburg has been included in the PWV in terms of its functional linkages to the region.

Being the most economically viable region, the PWV could play a crucial role, not only as a generator of economic growth for the country as a whole, but also in providing various forms of assistance and support to other less privileged areas. The integrated, highly developed and interdependent nature of the PWV economy should therefore be optimised.

### **Administrative and Institutional Capacity**

The PWV has more than adequate capacity to govern and manage development in the region. As elsewhere in the country, a need exists for the rationalisation and integration of institutional arrangements on regional and local levels. Management capacities as well as policy, strategy and planning arrangements are generally more developed than in other regions.

It must be stressed that from a regional and national point of view, the integrated management of this area is essential. In this context, it is important to minimise the dislocation of existing institutional and administrative capacity.

### **Geographical Coherence**

The PWV forms a coherent geographical entity.

### **Socio-Cultural Aspects**

The population of the region is very heterogenous in terms of language and other cultural indicators. A balanced application of the criteria for demarcation, especially socio-cultural considerations, does not justify the division of the region along these lines.



## **4.3 EASTERN TRANSVAAL**

### **4.3.1 Recommendation**

The Commission recommends that the Eastern Transvaal (with one dissension) be demarcated as shown in the accompanying map. The Commission has considered Kruger National Park to be single entity, although it has been demarcated into two regions for considerations such as electoral boundaries.

### **4.3.2 Summary of application of criteria**

#### **Economic Aspects**

The Eastern Transvaal region is regarded as an economically functional unit. The region has comparative advantages in terms of electricity, mining, agriculture and manufacturing. Important links exist with neighbouring regions, especially the PWV. The important development axes of the region are Bronkhorstspuit, Middleburg, Secunda and Witbank as well as links to the lowveld. Although the region shows high GGP per capita figures, it is an inflated representation of the economic resource base, as income largely flows out of the region.

#### **Administrative and Institutional Capacity**

The Eastern Transvaal region has an adequate governmental and management capacity due to the decentralisation of government departments, the facilities of the Kangwane administration and the existing three Regional Services Councils.

Although policy, strategy and planning arrangements as well as the general management capacity are at reasonable levels, future rationalisation and other capacity building efforts are necessary.

The region may lack certain aspects of institutional capacity such as tertiary institutions, but this can be addressed by inter-regional cooperation and satellite institutions, as is the case at the moment.

The location of a regional capital in this area is an issue which requires consideration.

### **Geographical coherence**

The Eastern Transvaal region as demarcated meets the criterion of geographical coherence and consolidates the existing fragmented homeland areas. It can be observed that in terms of urban-rural linkages, sufficient nodal points exist to service the region.

### **Socio-Cultural Aspects**

The region contains three major language groupings, namely Zulu, Afrikaans and Swazi. Although there is a diversity in terms of language and socio-cultural considerations, experience over the past decade has indicated a certain sense of regional identity and cooperation amongst various groups in the region.

## **4.4 KWAZULU/NATAL**

### **4.4.1 Recommendation**

The Commission recommends that the KwaZulu/Natal region be demarcated as indicated in the accompanying map. The Commission is of the opinion that the demarcation of the boundary between KwaZulu/Natal and Eastern Cape/Kei is a highly complex issue, which would require further consultation with affected parties.

### **4.4.2 Summary of application of criteria**

#### **Economic Aspects**

The Natal region exhibits the necessary features of economic functionality with several major urban centres serving as nodal points. In particular the Durban-Pinetown-Pietermaritzburg conurbation plays an important role in this regard.

The region is also economically viable, although the extent of development needs is shown by indicators such as infant mortality rates, access to water and sanitation and unemployment levels. Thus, the existence of a sound economic base with significant growth and development potential is tempered by the existing development needs.



### **Administrative and Institutional Capacity**

This region, as currently constituted, has the necessary administrative and institutional capacity to manage its functions. At present, a duplication of functions and institutions are clearly apparent in the KwaZulu and Natal areas, but this has been partly addressed by the establishment of Joint Services Boards and will be largely resolved by the new proposed region. Policy, strategy and planning information is available on the regional level, but it can be improved.

### **Geographical Coherence**

The region forms a geographical unit which has a strong sense of historical identity.

### **Socio-Cultural Aspects**

The region contains several language groups, with Zulu and English as the most prevalent. A strong sense of regional identity and belonging exists in the region as well as a sense of interdependency among the groups. This is illustrated by the various cooperative arrangements that have been established in the region.

## **4.5 ORANGE FREE STATE**

### **4.5.1. Recommendation**

The Commission recommends (with one dissension) that the OFS be demarcated as illustrated in the accompanying map.

### **4.5.2 Summary of application of criteria**

#### **Economic Aspects**

The Orange Free State is an economically functional area with its major nodal point as Bloemfontein. Other important nodes are Welkom and Phuthaditjaba. The OFS also has extensive interaction with the Cape region and the PWV.

With regard to economic viability, the OFS region has a diversified economic base, with mining, agriculture and services fulfilling important roles. The OFS region is noted for its natural resources, and is the third largest contributor to the agricultural product of the country.

### **Administrative and Institutional Capacity**

The region has fairly well developed administrative and institutional capacities given the facilities available in the various government departments, the provincial administration, and Qwa-Qwa self governing region.

The region also has a history of well developed tertiary and other training institutions which could provide the required managerial and other human resource development. Policy, strategy and planning institutions are also well developed.

### **Geographical Coherence**

The Orange Free State (OFS) region meets the criterion of geographical coherence. The OFS exhibits rural-urban linkages and has several nodal points including a possible regional capital, namely, Bloemfontein.

### **Socio-Cultural Aspects**

A large variety of language groups are represented in the region, such as Southern Sotho, Afrikaans, Xhosa and Tswana. A certain sense of regional belonging and interdependency exists among the various language groups.

## **4.6 NORTHWEST**

### **4.6.1 Recommendation**

The Commission recommends that a Northwest region, ( with one dissension) conforming to the boundaries indicated on the map, be demarcated.

### **4.6.2 Summary of application of criteria**

#### **Economic Aspects**

The Western Transvaal is a largely rural region with no major metropolitan centre. Its economic functionality centres around the largest node of Klerksdorp. Other nodes include Mmabatho, Vryburg, Rustenburg and Potchefstroom.



The region has well developed economic resources, making it relatively economically viable. Its economic base is characterised by well developed commercial agricultural and mining sector. In addition, it has a well developed infrastructure, linking it effectively to at least four other regions.

### **Institutional and Administrative Capacity**

The existing institutional and administrative capacity is unevenly distributed in the region. A substantial but relatively underutilised infrastructure exists in the Mmabatho area, which when rationalised, can meet the required planning, policy and development management needs.

### **Geographical Coherence**

The Western region forms a geographically coherent unit which incorporates most of the currently fragmented districts of Bophuthatswana. Through this incorporation, the appropriate rural-urban linkages is achieved by merging the economic core of the Western Transvaal with the largely rural parts of the Northern Cape.

## **4.7 NORTHERN CAPE**

### **4.7.1. Recommendation**

The Commission took a decision by an 8 to 7 majority on the establishment of a Northern Cape region. The Commission recommends that the Northern Cape be demarcated as indicated in the accompanying map.

### **4.7.2 Summary of application of criteria**

#### **Economic Aspects**

Although it has no major economic core, the region is economically functional with the main nodal points being Kimberley, Upington, Gordonia, Prieska and De Aar.

The region is relatively poorly off in terms of its economic resource base and quality of life indicators. Nevertheless it can function as an entity.

The region has comparative advantages in agriculture and mining.

### **Institutional and Administrative Capacity**

The area is served by the Cape Provincial Administration, 3 Regional Services Councils, and Regional Development Advisory Councils. The Northern Cape Division of the Supreme Court is situated in Kimberley. There is not enough institutional infrastructure to accommodate a regional government. There is however, a possibility of developing administrative infrastructure at the Kimberley and Upington nodal points.

### **Geographical Coherence**

This is the largest of all the regions with the lowest population density. The region is geographically coherent. However, it is largely rural with a few smaller urban centres, such as Kimberley and Upington.

### **Socio-Cultural**

The region has a considerable homogeneity in respect of language. There is also a developed sense of regional identity.

## **4.8 WESTERN CAPE**

### **4.8.1 Recommendation**

The Commission took a decision by a 8 to 7 majority on the establishment of smaller a Western Cape region. The Commission recommends that a Western Cape region be demarcated as indicated in the accompanying map.

### **Economic Aspects**

The Western Cape region is economically functional, with the core area being the highly industrialised Cape Town metropolitan centre.

It is an economically viable region because of its well developed and diversified industrial base and its successful commercial agricultural production.

The region as an entity, will be able to generate a sufficient income base to meet the needs of its population.



### **Institutional and Administrative Capacity**

With the national legislative capital and the Cape Provincial Administration capital, the Western Cape has sufficient institutional and administrative capacity to manage the development of the area, and undertake the necessary planning, policy and administrative functions associated with effective governance. Furthermore, there are adequate tertiary and other training institutions to facilitate capacity building in areas where it is currently deficient.

### **Socio-Cultural Aspects**

The Western Cape is a heterogenous region comprising primarily of Afrikaans, Xhosa and English speaking people. There is a sense of regional identity.

### **Geographical Coherence**

The Western Cape forms a geographically compact region with an urban bias.

## **4.9 EASTERN CAPE/KEI**

### **4.9.1 Recommendation**

The Commission recommends that an Eastern Cape/Kei (with one dissension) region be demarcated as indicated on the map.

### **4.9.2 Summary of application of criteria**

#### **Economic Aspects**

The Eastern Cape/Kei has two major economic nodes, Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage metropolitan area and East London, which service district subregional hinterlands. However linkages do exist between these two, which makes the Eastern Cape/Kei region economically functional as a whole.

There are intraregional disparities in the economic endowment of the Eastern Cape/Kei. Its economic viability therefore hinges on the strength of the economies of the major nodal points, both of which have a well developed industrial infrastructure. However, due to the disparities that exist in the region, the economic base may not be adequate to meet the fiscal requirements for adequate social and physical infrastructure.

### **Institutional and Administrative Capacity**

The most developed centre of institutional and administrative capacity is located in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage metropolitan area, where twenty percent of the population is located. The Border/Kei area does have some institutional and administrative capacity, due to the existence of regional institutions as well as the Ciskei and Transkei administrations. However, given that this area comprises 80 percent of the population and is underdeveloped, there is a need for an integrated approach to the utilisation of the existing capacity in order to optimise its impact for administrative and governance purposes.

Adequate capacity exists in the form of tertiary educational and training institutions to provide the necessary human resource development for the region.

There is a large degree of duplication of administrative structures in the region. These require rationalisation in order to establish an effective institutional and administrative capacity.

### **Geographical Coherence**

The geographical coherence of this region is demonstrated by the fact that it incorporates the Ciskei and Transkei into one integrated whole. This enhances all the infrastructural and economic linkages within the region which are currently treated as disparate entities.

### **Socio-Cultural Aspects**

The Eastern Cape/Kei is largely Xhosa speaking, with an English and Afrikaans speaking component. Despite differences of subregional identity, there is nevertheless an overall regional sense of identity within the larger area.



**SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILES OF THE  
PROPOSED SPR's**

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## LIST OF TABLES

1.	Salient features of the proposed SPRs.....	3
----	--	---

### DEMOGRAPHY

2.	Population distribution, 1991.....	4
----	------------------------------------	---

### LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT

3.	Labour force composition, 1980 and 1990.....	8
4.	Percentage distribution of the labour force, 1980 and 1990.....	9
5.	Labour indicators, 1980 and 1990.....	10
6.	Labour Force composition, 1980 and 1990 (%).....	11
7.	Labour force distribution, 1980 and 1990 (%).....	12

### GROSS GEOGRAPHIC PRODUCT

8.	GGP at constant 1985 prices, 1988.....	14
9.	Composition of real GGP, 1988.....	14
10.	Composition of the real GGP, 1988.....	15
11.	Change in the % composition of the real GGP, 1970-1988.....	15
12.	Average annual growth in GGP, 1970-1988.....	17



## LIST OF GRAPHS

### DEMOGRAPHY

1.	Population distribution per region, 1991.....	5
2.	Population density per region, 1991.....	5
3.	Population growth rate, 1985-1991.....	6
4.	Growth in urbanisation, 1985-1991.....	6
5.	Adult males as % of adult population, 1991.....	7
6.	Children under 15 as % of population, 1991.....	7

### GROSS GEOGRAPHIC PRODUCT

7.	GGP distribution per region, 1988.....	13
8.	Real GGP <i>per capita</i> , 1988.....	13
9.	Personal income <i>per capita</i> , 1985.....	16
10.	Personal income to GGP ratio, 1985.....	16

### Salient features of the proposed SPRs

Indicator	Western Cape	Northern Cape	OFS	Eastern Cape	KwaZulu/ Natal	Eastern Transvaal	Northern Transvaal	PWV area	North West	South Africa
Area ('000 km <sup>2</sup> )	108,6	346,5	128,4	174,2	87,4	78,3	174,0	25,3	151,2	1 220,1
Population ('000)	3 392,7	726,6	2 723,3	6 137,0	7 590,2	2 129,5	4 525,3	9 267,2	2 396,6	38 888,4
Population growth (%) (1985 to 1991)	2,2	0,9	2,1	1,9	1,8	2,6	3,1	3,6	1,8	2,5
Density (persons per km <sup>2</sup> )	31,2	2,1	21,2	35,1	86,8	27,2	26,0	366,1	15,8	31,9
Official urbanisation level (%)	86,1	65,8	48,9	35,0	39,4	35,3	8,8	82,4	29,3	49,8
Growth in urbanisation (%) (1985 to 1991)	2,5	1,8	3,1	3,1	2,0	3,5	3,6	3,7	2,1	3,0
Illiteracy rate (econ active pop)	8,5	23,4	19,8	28,5	27,8	31,5	35,1	12,5	35,5	20,7
Potential labour force ('000)	1 686,6	325,3	1 199,0	2 156,8	3 044,0	921,2	1 418,5	4 573,3	1 015,2	16 339,9
Participation rate	67,2	64,3	66,5	43,3	52,7	67,1	38,1	70,9	56,4	58,7
Absorption capacity	60,0	51,4	55,3	37,6	44,0	54,0	32,4	53,1	52,5	48,4
Official unemployment rate	9,6	12,3	11,2	24,8	18,8	8,9	17,0	13,5	15,1	14,7
Male absenteeism rate	8,5	10,4	26,5	-29,4	-14,3	24,6	-37,1	35,8	11,8	0,8
Dependency rate	1,3	1,7	1,6	3,6	2,5	1,6	4,8	1,1	2,2	2,0
Real GGP (R million) (1988)	15 620	2 371	7 327	9 017	17 440	9 835	3 786	47 100	8 223	120 715
Real annual growth in GGP (1970 to 1988)	1,8	1,6	-0,6	1,8	1,9	3,3	4,3	0,8	1,2	1,4
Percentage distribution	12,9	2,0	6,1	7,5	14,4	8,1	3,1	39,0	6,8	100
GGP <i>per capita</i> (R) (1988)	4 906	3 353	2 861	1 553	2 421	4 974	914	5 624	3 619	3 332
Personal income/GGP (%) (1985)	92,6	101,9	68,1	90,3	87,7	42,5	87,6	77,4	57,7	77,1
Personal income <i>per capita</i> (1985)	4 373	2 817	2 184	1 360	1 971	2 341	725	4 575	2 000	2 580




**Table 1: Population distribution, 1991**

Region	Population ('000)	Urbanisation level	Population groups				Age structure			Gender structure	
			Asian	Black	Coloured	White	<1-14 yrs	15-64 yrs	65 yrs +	Male	Female
Western Cape	3392.7	86.1	0.7	17.8	59.7	22.1	30.6	64.5	4.9	51.1	48.9
Northern Cape	726.6	65.8	0.2	31.0	53.9	14.9	37.4	57.9	4.7	51.4	48.6
Orange Free State	2723.3	48.9	0.0	85.2	2.7	12.1	39.4	57.4	3.2	53.3	46.7
Eastern Cape	6137.0	35.0	0.2	87.2	6.7	5.9	44.2	50.2	5.5	45.0	55.0
KwaZulu/Natal	7590.2	39.4	11.1	80.0	1.5	7.5	42.3	54.3	3.3	47.6	52.4
Eastern Transvaal	2129.5	35.3	0.5	84.6	0.9	14.0	39.9	57.6	2.5	53.3	46.7
Northern Transvaal	4525.3	8.8	0.1	97.1	0.1	2.7	51.0	45.5	3.5	44.5	55.5
PWV area	9267.2	82.4	1.6	70.6	3.2	24.6	29.3	67.2	3.5	55.2	44.8
North West	2396.6	29.3	0.3	86.5	2.8	10.4	40.0	55.8	4.2	51.3	48.7
<b>South Africa</b>	<b>38888.4</b>	<b>49.8</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>75.6</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>13.0</b>	<b>38.9</b>	<b>57.2</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>


Source: Development Information Group, 1993

### Population distribution per region, 1991




### Population density per region, 1991

(persons/km<sup>2</sup>)








**Population growth rate, 1985-1991**



**Growth in urbanisation, 1985-1991**









<b>Table 2: Labour force composition, 1980 and 1990</b>							
<b>Year</b>	<b>Region</b>	<b>Potential labour force</b>	<b>Peripheral sector</b>	<b>Labour force</b>	<b>Formal employment</b>	<b>Unemployment</b>	<b>Informal/under-employed</b>
		<b>1)</b>	<b>2)</b>	<b>3)</b>			
<b>1980</b>							
	Western Cape	1210351	196564	1013787	860270	53881	99636
	Northern Cape	272211	39534	232677	195174	16502	21001
	Orange Free State	909642	149632	760010	658096	46255	55659
	Eastern Cape	1835467	811651	1023816	789624	138424	95768
	KwaZulu/Natal	2388754	809390	1579364	1221633	191580	166151
	Eastern Transvaal	743983	133782	610201	523072	24549	62580
	Northern Transvaal	1043173	518778	524395	416497	48721	59177
	PWV	3204053	371815	2832238	2336366	207029	288843
	North West	845488	175973	669515	559648	43670	66197
	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>12453122</b>	<b>3207119</b>	<b>9246003</b>	<b>7560380</b>	<b>770611</b>	<b>915012</b>
<b>1990</b>							
	Western Cape	1686618	190978	1495640	1012381	143305	339954
	Northern Cape	325251	49909	275342	167210	33852	74280
	Orange Free State	1198976	167359	1031617	662648	114943	254026
	Eastern Cape	2156787	850079	1306708	810446	312075	184187
	KwaZulu/Natal	3044035	861006	2183029	1340452	403547	439030
	Eastern Transvaal	921245	120055	801190	497151	71047	232992
	Northern Transvaal	1418477	651692	766785	459694	123052	184039
	PWV	4573297	418410	4154887	2428138	561690	1165059
	North West	1015216	262614	752602	533276	112108	107218
	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>16339902</b>	<b>3572102</b>	<b>12767800</b>	<b>7911396</b>	<b>1875619</b>	<b>2980785</b>

- 1) Consists of 95% of males and 55% of females in the age group 15-64 years.
- 2) Represents persons in the subsistence agricultural sector and persons active in the informal sector resulting from subsistence agricultural sector.
- 3) Represents the economically active population.
- 4) Represents the number of formal employment opportunities available.
- 5) Unemployment according to the population census:- 1990 figures are estimates.
- 6) Estimates of the number of persons active in the informal sector, excluding peripheral sector informal activities.

Source: Development Information Group, 1993



<b>Table 3: Percentage distribution of the labour force, 1980 and 1990</b>							
<b>Year</b>	<b>Region</b>	<b>Potential labour force 1)</b>	<b>Peripheral sector 2)</b>	<b>Labour force 3)</b>	<b>Formal employ- ment</b>	<b>Unemploy- ment</b>	<b>Informal/ under- employed</b>
<b>1980</b>							
	Western Cape	9.7	6.1	11.0	11.4	7.0	10.9
	Northern Cape	2.2	1.2	2.5	2.6	2.1	2.3
	Orange Free State	7.3	4.7	8.2	8.7	6.0	6.1
	Eastern Cape	14.7	25.3	11.1	10.4	18.0	10.5
	KwaZulu/Natal	19.2	25.2	17.1	16.2	24.9	18.2
	Eastern Transvaal	6.0	4.2	6.6	6.9	3.2	6.8
	Northern Transvaal	8.4	16.2	5.7	5.5	6.3	6.5
	PWV	25.7	11.6	30.6	30.9	26.9	31.6
	North West	6.8	5.5	7.2	7.4	5.7	7.2
	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>1990</b>							
	Western Cape	10.3	5.3	11.7	12.8	7.6	11.4
	Northern Cape	2.0	1.4	2.2	2.1	1.8	2.5
	Orange Free State	7.3	4.7	8.1	8.4	6.1	8.5
	Eastern Cape	13.2	23.8	10.2	10.2	16.6	6.2
	KwaZulu/Natal	18.6	24.1	17.1	16.9	21.5	14.7
	Eastern Transvaal	5.6	3.4	6.3	6.3	3.8	7.8
	Northern Transvaal	8.7	18.2	6.0	5.8	6.6	6.2
	PWV	28.0	11.7	32.5	30.7	29.9	39.1
	North West	6.2	7.4	5.9	6.7	6.0	3.6
	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

- 1) Consists of 95% of males and 55% of females in the age group 15-64 years.  
2) Represents persons in the subsistence agricultural sector and persons active in the informal sector resulting from subsistence agricultural sector.  
3) Represents the economically active population.  
4) Represents the number of formal employment opportunities available.  
5) Unemployment according to the population census:- 1990 figures are estimates.  
6) Estimates of the number of persons active in the informal sector, excluding peripheral sector informal activities.

Source: Development Information Group, 1993



Table 4: Labour indicators, 1980 and 1990								
Year	Region	Participation rate (%) 1)	Dependency ratio				Male absenteeism rate (%) 6)	Unemployment rate (%) 7)
			Total	Youth	Inactive	Aged		
			2)	3)	4)	5)		
1980								
	Western Cape	63.4	1.5	0.8	0.6	0.1	6.7	5.3
	Northern Cape	64.5	1.8	1.1	0.6	0.1	4.5	7.1
	Orange Free State	64.3	1.7	1.1	0.6	0.1	22.3	6.1
	Eastern Cape	39.9	3.9	2.1	1.5	0.3	-29.7	14.1
	KwaZulu/Natal	48.8	2.9	1.7	1.0	0.1	-11.0	12.3
	Eastern Transvaal	64.1	1.7	1.0	0.6	0.1	36.9	4.0
	Northern Transvaal	35.7	5.0	3.0	1.8	0.2	-32.6	9.8
	PWV	67.8	1.2	0.7	0.5	0.1	18.9	7.3
	North West	61.0	1.9	1.1	0.6	0.1	23.3	6.6
	South Africa	55.6	2.2	1.3	0.8	0.1	-1.41	8.3
1990								
	Western Cape	67.2	1.3	0.7	0.5	0.1	8.5	9.6
	Northern Cape	64.3	1.7	1.0	0.6	0.1	10.4	12.3
	Orange Free State	66.5	1.6	1.0	0.5	0.1	26.5	11.2
	Eastern Cape	43.3	3.6	2.0	1.3	0.3	-29.4	24.8
	KwaZulu/Natal	52.7	2.5	1.4	0.9	0.1	-14.3	18.8
	Eastern Transvaal	67.1	1.6	1.0	0.5	0.1	24.6	8.9
	Northern Transvaal	38.1	4.8	2.9	1.6	0.2	-37.1	17.0
	PWV	70.9	1.1	0.6	0.4	0.1	35.8	13.5
	North West	56.4	2.2	1.3	0.8	0.1	11.8	15.1
	South Africa	58.7	2.0	1.2	0.7	0.1	0.8	14.7

- 1) Economically active population as percentage of the potential economically active population.
- 2) Total number of persons supported by every economically active person excluding himself.
- 3) Number of children (0-14 years) supported by every economically active person.
- 4) Number of not active persons (15-64 years) supported by every economically active person.
- 5) Number of aged persons (65+ years) supported by every economically active person.
- 6) Number of males absent or present in an area; (-) indicates absenteeism.
- 7) The unemployed as percentage of the economically active population.

Source: Development Information Group, 1993

Table 5: Labour force composition, 1980 and 1990 (%)											
Year	Region	Agriculture	Mining	Manufac- turing	Energy	Construc- tion	Commerce	Transport	Finance	Services	Total
1980											
	Western Cape	10.5	0.4	24.6	1.1	7.1	13.3	8.5	5.7	28.8	100
	Northern Cape	21.7	11.0	5.7	1.6	6.9	11.2	10.6	2.2	29.1	100
	Orange Free State	20.6	22.8	5.6	0.5	4.1	10.2	5.2	1.8	29.3	100
	Eastern Cape	19.4	3.1	18.2	0.6	5.0	12.3	7.4	2.8	31.2	100
	KwaZulu/Natal	12.7	2.9	25.4	0.8	4.7	13.7	8.5	3.5	27.7	100
	Eastern Transvaal	24.1	15.4	12.0	3.6	10.5	9.5	4.7	1.3	18.9	100
	Northern Transvaal	30.6	11.7	6.9	0.5	5.1	12.2	3.5	1.3	28.2	100
	PWV	2.9	9.0	26.9	1.1	4.4	13.9	6.7	6.0	29.2	100
	North West	20.3	34.7	4.6	0.5	3.8	9.1	3.2	1.4	22.5	100
	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>13.4</b>	<b>10.2</b>	<b>19.3</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>6.6</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>27.9</b>	<b>100</b>
1990											
	Western Cape	11.2	0.5	23.2	0.9	7.7	14.1	5.7	7.9	28.9	100
	Northern Cape	25.0	8.6	5.4	1.3	5.8	10.7	6.5	2.8	33.9	100
	Orange Free State	14.2	27.2	7.6	0.7	3.7	9.6	3.9	2.6	30.4	100
	Eastern Cape	17.4	3.4	19.7	0.6	5.9	11.4	4.7	3.5	33.4	100
	KwaZulu/Natal	9.9	1.7	24.9	0.8	5.0	14.2	6.6	5.3	31.5	100
	Eastern Transvaal	23.7	15.2	13.0	3.7	4.9	9.8	4.1	2.6	23.1	100
	Northern Transvaal	20.3	8.3	8.1	1.0	7.0	11.9	3.9	2.4	37.1	100
	PWV	2.4	7.4	23.3	1.2	5.5	13.7	5.9	8.7	32.1	100
	North West	16.8	32.6	5.7	0.4	4.1	8.8	2.7	2.1	26.8	100
	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>11.1</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>18.8</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>31.0</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Development Information Group, 1993




Table 6: Labour force distribution, 1980 and 1990 (%)											
Year	Region	Agriculture	Mining	Manufac- turing	Energy	Construc- tion	Commerce	Transport	Finance	Services	Total
1980											
	Western Cape	8.9	0.4	14.5	11.6	15.4	12.2	14.5	16.9	11.8	11.4
	Northern Cape	4.2	2.8	0.8	4.0	3.4	2.3	4.1	1.5	2.7	2.6
	Orange Free State	13.4	19.5	2.5	4.1	6.8	7.1	6.8	4.1	9.2	8.7
	Eastern Cape	15.2	3.2	9.8	5.9	9.9	10.3	11.7	7.5	11.7	10.4
	KwaZulu/Natal	15.4	4.6	21.2	13.1	14.4	17.8	20.7	14.9	16.1	16.2
	Eastern Transvaal	12.5	10.5	4.3	23.9	13.8	5.3	4.9	2.3	4.7	6.9
	Northern Transvaal	12.6	6.3	2.0	2.5	5.4	5.4	2.9	1.9	5.6	5.5
	PWV	6.7	27.4	43.1	31.8	25.6	34.3	31.0	48.3	32.4	30.9
	North West	11.2	25.3	1.8	3.3	5.3	5.4	3.5	2.7	6.0	7.4
	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
1990											
	Western Cape	12.9	0.7	15.8	10.4	17.7	14.4	13.9	17.9	11.9	12.8
	Northern Cape	4.7	2.0	0.6	2.6	2.2	1.8	2.6	1.1	2.3	2.1
	Orange Free State	10.7	25.1	3.4	5.5	5.6	6.4	6.2	3.9	8.2	8.4
	Eastern Cape	16.0	3.8	10.8	5.6	11.0	9.3	9.1	6.4	11.1	10.2
	KwaZulu/Natal	15.1	3.2	22.5	11.9	15.2	19.3	21.2	15.9	17.2	16.9
	Eastern Transvaal	13.4	10.5	4.3	21.6	5.5	4.9	4.9	2.8	4.7	6.3
	Northern Transvaal	10.6	5.3	2.5	5.3	7.4	5.5	4.3	2.4	7.0	5.8
	PWV	6.5	25.0	38.0	34.4	30.4	33.5	34.4	47.1	31.8	30.7
	North West	10.2	24.2	2.1	2.7	5.0	4.7	3.5	2.5	5.8	6.7
	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>


Source: Development Information Group, 1993



**GGP distribution per region, 1988**



**Real GGP *per capita*, 1988 (R)**





**Table 7: GGP at constant 1985 prices, 1988 (R million)**

Region	Agriculture	Mining	Manufacturing	Energy	Construction	Commerce	Transport	Finance	Services	Total
Western Cape	1 325	38	3 874	559	544	2 409	1 577	2 222	3 071	15 620
Northern Cape	361	536	122	100	46	217	334	190	466	2 371
Orange Free State	1 083	2 553	460	125	223	557	546	577	1 204	7 327
Eastern Cape	755	17	2 166	266	331	1 168	976	894	2 444	9 017
Kwazulu/Natal	1 343	458	5 274	393	616	2 116	2 194	1 806	3 240	17 440
Eastern Transvaal	1 090	2 263	2 161	2 320	162	455	331	325	728	9 835
Northern Transvaal	567	560	333	247	180	345	168	246	1 141	3 786
PWV area	436	4 989	13 683	1 382	1 494	6 196	3 897	7 060	7 964	47 100
North West	639	4 892	475	65	180	450	229	431	862	8 223
<b>South Africa</b>	<b>7 599</b>	<b>16 305</b>	<b>28 548</b>	<b>5 455</b>	<b>3 776</b>	<b>13 913</b>	<b>10 252</b>	<b>13 751</b>	<b>21 121</b>	<b>120 719</b>

Source: Development Information Group, 1993

**Table 8: Composition of the real GGP, 1988 (%)**

Region	Agriculture	Mining	Manufacturing	Energy	Construction	Commerce	Transport	Finance	Services	Total
Western Cape	8.5	0.2	24.8	3.6	3.5	15.4	10.1	14.2	19.7	100
Northern Cape	15.2	22.6	5.1	4.2	1.9	9.1	14.1	8.0	19.7	100
Orange Free State	14.8	34.8	6.3	1.7	3.0	7.6	7.4	7.9	16.4	100
Eastern Cape	8.4	0.2	24.0	2.9	3.7	13.0	10.8	9.9	27.1	100
Kwazulu/Natal	7.7	2.6	30.2	2.3	3.5	12.1	12.6	10.4	18.6	100
Eastern Transvaal	11.1	23.0	22.0	23.6	1.6	4.6	3.4	3.3	7.4	100
Northern Transvaal	15.0	14.8	8.8	6.5	4.7	9.1	4.4	6.5	30.1	100
PWV area	0.9	10.6	29.1	2.9	3.2	13.2	8.3	15.0	16.9	100
North West	7.8	59.5	5.8	0.8	2.2	5.5	2.8	5.2	10.5	100
<b>South Africa</b>	<b>6.3</b>	<b>13.5</b>	<b>23.6</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>11.5</b>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>11.4</b>	<b>17.5</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Development Information Group, 1993



**Table 9: Composition of the real GGP, 1988 (%)**

Region	Agriculture	Mining	Manufac- turing	Energy	Construc- tion	Commerce	Transport	Finance	Services	Total
Western Cape	17.4	0.2	13.6	10.2	14.4	17.3	15.4	16.2	14.5	12.9
Northern Cape	4.8	3.3	0.4	1.8	1.2	1.6	3.3	1.4	2.2	2.0
Orange Free State	14.3	15.7	1.6	2.3	5.9	4.0	5.3	4.2	5.7	6.1
Eastern Cape	9.9	0.1	7.6	4.9	8.8	8.4	9.5	6.5	11.6	7.5
Kwazulu/Natal	17.7	2.8	18.5	7.2	16.3	15.2	21.4	13.1	15.3	14.4
Eastern Transvaal	14.3	13.9	7.6	42.5	4.3	3.3	3.2	2.4	3.4	8.1
Northern Transvaal	7.5	3.4	1.2	4.5	4.8	2.5	1.6	1.8	5.4	3.1
PWV area	5.7	30.6	47.9	25.3	39.6	44.5	38.0	51.3	37.7	39.0
North West	8.4	30.0	1.7	1.2	4.8	3.2	2.2	3.1	4.1	6.8
<b>South Africa</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>



Source: Development Information Group, 1993

**Table 10: Change in the percentage composition of the real GGP, 1988**

Region	Agriculture	Mining	Manufac- turing	Energy	Construc- tion	Commerce	Transport	Finance	Services
Western Cape	0.9	-0.5	-1.4	0.3	-1.6	1.2	0.8	1.7	-1.5
Northern Cape	3.8	-28.9	2.3	1.9	0.3	3.3	3.6	5.4	8.4
Orange Free State	3.5	-24.0	2.4	0.6	1.3	1.9	1.8	5.3	7.1
Eastern Cape	0.0	-0.8	-6.0	0.6	-0.6	0.7	-1.6	1.6	6.2
Kwazulu/Natal	1.3	-2.7	-0.9	-2.0	-2.2	0.9	2.0	2.2	1.3
Eastern Transvaal	-2.9	-18.3	10.9	15.7	-0.4	-1.7	-2.1	1.8	-2.8
Northern Transvaal	6.1	-50.7	4.7	5.8	3.0	4.4	1.9	4.9	19.9
PWV area	0.1	-6.0	1.5	1.0	-2.6	1.1	2.3	-0.4	2.9
North West	-0.2	-12.5	2.5	0.3	0.7	1.5	0.6	3.8	3.1
<b>South Africa</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>-11.3</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>-1.3</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>3.1</b>

Source: Development Information Group, 1993





**Table 11: Average annual growth in GGP, 1970-1988 (%)**

Region	Agriculture		Mining		Manufacturing		Energy		Construction		Commerce		Transport		Finance		Services		Total	
	70-80	80-88	70-80	80-88	70-80	80-88	70-80	80-88	70-80	80-88	70-80	80-88	70-80	80-88	70-80	80-88	70-80	80-88	70-80	80-88
Western Cape	2.0	5.2	-4.6	-2.4	3.1	1.6	-1.2	9.3	2.3	-1.5	2.5	4.2	5.5	0.5	4.1	2.7	3.1	1.4	3.1	1.8
Northern Cape	0.9	2.0	-10.0	2.4	4.9	0.8	2.1	4.4	2.1	-1.2	3.4	0.8	2.1	0.4	9.5	2.1	2.0	4.0	-2.1	1.6
Orange Free State	4.5	-1.4	-2.2	-3.0	4.5	1.3	3.0	2.6	4.9	1.7	4.2	-0.7	3.9	-0.7	10.6	2.2	3.8	3.1	1.2	-0.6
Eastern Cape	5.6	0.5	-8.2	-3.2	3.0	0.8	5.1	4.0	3.5	1.2	3.7	3.5	4.8	-0.2	5.8	2.4	4.5	5.2	4.1	1.8
Kwazulu/Natal	2.8	7.1	0.6	-1.7	5.6	0.7	-2.4	3.2	2.9	-1.7	3.6	4.6	6.9	1.7	6.4	3.2	3.9	4.1	4.5	1.9
Eastern Transvaal	5.1	4.2	3.3	1.8	10.7	9.5	20.5	3.7	7.4	1.4	4.8	3.4	5.6	0.3	16.1	4.1	4.5	3.7	7.6	3.3
Northern Transvaal	3.9	4.4	-12.2	0.0	6.9	3.7	1.2	33.9	6.1	7.9	4.1	5.7	6.2	1.9	13.6	3.9	6.5	8.4	-2.3	4.3
PWV area	4.9	0.5	0.0	-0.3	5.8	-1.1	3.8	6.2	2.0	-4.5	3.4	2.2	6.5	1.7	1.4	3.3	3.5	3.5	3.6	0.8
North West	6.5	-4.7	-0.8	2.0	7.8	1.2	7.1	2.1	4.5	2.6	4.6	2.0	3.6	2.3	13.2	4.5	4.2	2.7	1.6	1.2
<b>South Africa</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>-1.7</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>-1.9</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>1.4</b>

Source: Development Information Group, 1993



Requests by political parties for submissions. [A]  
Use this list for reference. From page 5  
our reference is different from the  
numbers used in the report.

## APPENDIX B

### LIST OF WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS RECEIVED BY THE COMMISSION ON THE DEMARCATION/ DELIMITATION OF REGIONS/ STATES/ PROVINCES

1. Negotiation Council - Memorandum for briefing of the Commission and the Resolution by Negotiating Council (8 June 1993).
2. Technical Committee on Constitutional matters. Reports of the Technical Committee (13 May/19 May/27 May/3 June).
3. PA Pienaar (Unisa) - A model for the delimitation of autonomous regions in SA.
4. CBM Conference - Regions in SA: Constitutional options and their implications for good government and a sound economy.
5. Highveld Regional Services Council - Regional Government in SA. The spotlight on Region F (14 June 1993).
6. Municipality of Port Alfred (14 June 1993).
7. Grahamstown Chamber of Commerce and Industry (17 June 1993).
8. Delmas Town Council - "Indeling van Delmas Landroosdistrik by voorgestelde streekregering vir Oos-Transvaal" (14 June 1993).
9. Oudtshoorn Attorneys Association - Oudtshoorn: Retention in Western Province (18 June 1993).
10. Klein Karoo Regional Industrial and Commercial Marketing - Oudtshoorn: Retention in Western Province Region (18 June 1993).
11. Mr Reuben Sive - Proposal for boundaries on new provinces in SA in support of the recommendation of the SA Law Commission (18 June 1993).
12. The Judges of the Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division of the Supreme Court (18 June 1993).
13. Amabulu tribe - Land Claim (18 June 1993).
14. Technical Committee on Constitutional Issues - Report 5 and first supplementary report on constitutional principles (15 June 1993).
15. Venterstad Municipality - "Streeksindeling: Inskakeling van Venterstad by sentrale streek (OVS)" (18 June 1993).
16. Underberg Health Committee (21 June 1993).
17. Democratic Party - Nelspruit Constituency: Comments on the inclusion of Kruger National Park in Region F and inclusion of Pretoria in Region F (22 June 1993).



18. "Distriksrade van die NP van Carnarvon, Van Wyksvlei, Fraserburg, Williston, Sutherland, Brandvlei, Calvinia en Loeriesfontein" (23 June 1993).
19. East Griqualand Regional Development Association - Motivation why East Griqualand should remain part of Region E (Natal) (17 June 1993).
20. Mr M Britz - Potchefstroom (18 June 1993).
21. Concerned taxpayer (19 June 1993).
22. Democratic Party - Northern Transvaal - A model for the Delimitation of Regions in SA (PA Pienaar) (21 June 1993).
23. W J Wolfaard - Hofmeyr: South Africa is one country (19 June 1993).
24. Department of Water Affairs and Forestry: "Bosbou Suid - Kaap/Tsitsikama inheemse woude" (16 June 1993).
25. Mr AL Badenhorst, Garden View - Map (19 June 1993).
26. MJ Molaodi, Boksburg - Map.
27. Mr LJ Kruger, Verwoerdburg - "SA, Onafhanklike state" (15 June 1993).
28. Dr HB Narain, Richmond Natal (9 June 1993).
29. Mr Peter Clark, Pine Town - Constitutional plan 1980, A blueprint for natural democracy; comprising of ten autonomous cantons.
30. Mr Bonginkosi Zungu and Musa Khumalo - Ingqayiziyele (19 June 1993).
31. Mr SS Sebitlosne, Rocklands - Bloemfontein (21 June 1993).
32. Mr SM Motha, Kwa-Themba, Springs - 22 June 1993.
33. Mr JM Morolong, Germiston (21 June 1993).
34. Dr HB Narain - Compromise solution, Richmond Natal.
35. Mr SM Ponnon, Chatsworth - "Nuwe kaart van Suid Afrika" (11 June 1993).
36. Dikwankwetla Party - QwaQwa Demarcation Committee, Report: Proposed Regional Demarcation (23 June 1993).
37. Drakensberg Regional Services Council (14 and 24 June 1993).
38. Upper Orange Regional Development Society, Region 11 - Incorporation of RDA 11 into the Free State Region (24 June 1993).
39. Tarkastad Municipality (23 June 1993).
40. Thabazimbi Town Council - "DOV Thabazimbi" (25 June 1993).



41. Midland Chamber of Industries, Region D or East Cape Region (22 June 1993).
42. Regional Development Advisory Committee - Eastern Transvaal (23 June 1993).
43. Dr RC Fox, Department of Geography, Rhodes University (11 June 1993).
44. Outeniqua Rural Council (28 June 1993).
45. Mr M McConnell, Howick (15 June 1993).
46. Mr WC Cronje, Boordfontein (24 June 1993).
47. Dr DE Michael, Wynberg (23 June 1993).
48. The mayor's Parlour, Burgersdorp (CP) (24 June 1993).
49. Mr BJ vd Merwe - Botha's Hill (14 June 1993).
50. Dr RD Undritz, Maclear (23 June 1993).
51. "Nelspruit Afrikaanse Sakekamer" - Regional and Development Economic Forum for the Eastern Transvaal.
52. Mayor of Queenstown, Memorandum of motivation for Queenstown to be the capital of Regional Government.
53. Natal Agriculture Union - Demarcation of boundaries for the Natal Region - An agriculture perspective (July 1993).
54. Bajiet Jahweh - "Boervolk voorstelle" (25 Junie 1993).
55. Grahamstown Ratepayers Association (1 July 1993).
56. Joubertina Belastingbetalersvereniging (1 July 1993).
57. Cape Town Chamber of Commerce (30 June 1993).
58. Underberg Farmers Association (28 June 1993).
59. Chief Gladstone R Hlwele, Claim to Chieftainship and to land in the Stutterheim and Komgha Districts: Ama-Mbalu Tribe (14 June 1993).
60. Mr O Bothma - "Selfregerende streek, Kaapland" (19 June 1993).
61. Midland Chamber of Industries (28 June 1993).
62. Southern Natal Chamber of Business - Motivation why Southern Natal should remain part of Region E (Natal) (28 June 1993).
63. Ellisras DDA, "Die Satswa-Streeksinisiatief" (24 June 1993).
64. "Burgersdorp Distriks Boere - Unie" (23 June 1993).



65. Municipality of Steynsburg, "Indeling van Oranje Streeksontwikkelingsvereniging" (23 Junie 1993).
66. "Steynsburg Boere-Unie, Indeling van Oranje Streeksontwikkelingsvereniging" (23 Junie 1993).
67. Khwezinaledi Civic Association - Motivation for RDA 11 (24 June 1993).
68. Vaalwater District Agriculture Union (1 July 1993).
69. Ecumenical Forum on Human Rights in Bophuthatswana re SATSWA submissions (29 June 1993).
70. East Griqualand Joint Services Board (30 June 1993).
71. Aliwal Business Association - "Inkorporasie by die OVS streek" (23 June 1993).
72. Ladey Grey Farmers Association (23 June 1993).
73. Mr HW Coelen (29 June 1993).
74. Mr NP Macdonald (30 June 1993).
75. Stormsrivier Rate Payers Association (30 June 1993).
76. FR Corner, Wildernis (27 June 1993).
77. Carletonville Municipality (29 June 1993).
78. Mr FJ Smit, Douglas - "Streek B: Hoofstad Kimberley".
79. Mr E Mbokoda, Hluvukani (19 June 1993).
80. Mr S Zunzu, Mandini (24 June 1993).
81. Individual, Emondlo (21 June 1993).
82. Mr ED Dlamini, Vryheid (23 June 1993).
83. Mr T Hlabangwana, Sebokeng.
84. Mr CF Heslinga, Menlo Park (23 June 1993).
85. Mr EP Nel, Theunissen.
86. Mr MJ de Jager, Vochville (21 June 1993).
87. South African Chamber of Business (2 July 1993).
- ✓ 88. Committee of Investigation into Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in South Africa (KIFVSA) (June 1993).
89. Regional Convention of the Vaal Triangle.



90. Mr David Guise, Submission based on the book "Freedom for all" (2 July 1993).
91. "Prokureurs van Vryburg, Memorandum met betrekking tot die posisie van Vryburg" (1 Julie 1993).
92. Prof P Roelf Botha (5 July 1993).
93. ENAPAT.
94. Council for the Environment.
95. "Streeksontwikkelings-Advieskomitee vir Streek B", July 1993.
96. Eskom submission to the Commission on the Demarcation of Government Regions (5 July 1993).
97. Vincent Leggo Associates - Definition of boundaries: Primary Local Authorities within the Western Corridor of the Durban Functional Region (DFR).
98. Streekindeling: George, Sedgefield, Knysna en Plettenbergbaai.
99. United Federal Party (UPF) proposal regarding the establishment of the Boerestaat (14 June 1993).
100. Border Business Action Committee, East London - Creation of Border Kei Region.
101. The Law of Society of the Cape of Good Hope (29 June 1993).
102. Proposal for determination of the boundaries of the Bot River Valley.
103. The Satswa initiative: The current status, 1993.
104. The Town Council of Randfontein, the Local Area Committee of Hillside and the Local area Committee of Dwarskloof/Brandvlei.
105. Republic of Ciskei - Proposal for a Kei State and Supplementary submission.
106. Border Kei Development Forum (29 June 1993).
107. African National Congress - The delimitation of regions.
108. Algoa RSC - Demarcation of a region for the Eastern Cape (30 June 1993).
109. Afrikaner-Volksunie.
110. Bophuthatswana Government (2 July 1993).
111. Prof PF vd Schyff - Potchefstroom University (2 July 1993).
112. Development Bank of Southern Africa (June 1993).
113. West Rand Regional Services Council.

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- 118 115. Kimberley Afrikaanse Sakekamer (8 July 1993).
- 119 116. City Council of Klerksdorp - "Posisionering van Klerksdorp in 'n toekomsgerigte streekregering" (30 June 1993).
- 120 117. RSA Government - Boundries for regions to establish Regional Government in SA (July 1993)
- 121 118. City Council of Pretoria; Town Councils of Akasia, Brits, Bronkhorstspuit, Hartbeespoort, Midrand, Verwoerdburg and Pretoria Regional Services Council - Regional Government for South Africa: Motivation report on the creation of an autonomous region for the greater Pretoria area together with the Eastern Transvaal (Development Region F) (5 July 1993).
- 122 119. The Afrikaner Freedom Foundation.
- 123 120. IDASA - Transvaal Office, Demarcation of Regions - Options for the Northern Transvaal (B de Villiers & R Humphries).
- 124 121. Afrikaner Volksfront - A border negotiation process to minimise conflict and optimise economic interaction (Two submissions).
- 125 122. Regional Development Advisory Committee A (5 July 1993).
- 126 123. "Noordweste Streeksdiensteraad - Voorgestelde grense: Noordweste".
- 127 124. Democratic Party submission to the Commission on the Demarcation/Delimitation of Regions.
- 128 125. "Noordweste Leiersforum - Voorgestelde grense - Noordweste."
- 129 126. "Namakwalandse Streekontwikkelingsvereniging".
- 130 127. Namaqualand Regional Services Council (1 July 1993).
- 131 128. "Noordweste Toerisme Vereniging - Voorgestelde Grense: Noordweste".
- 132 129. Calvinia Municipality, "Memorandum in sake die skepping van 'n Noordweste-streek en die vasstelling van die grense daarvan".
- 133 130. "Bestuurskomitees van Carnarvon en Van Wyksvlei".
- 134 131. "Noordweste-Kaaplandse Ontwikkelingsvereniging" (1 July 1993).
- 135 132. MS vd Spuy and DE Smit, Vredendal.
- 136 133. "Calvinia Landelike Raad - Voorgestelde grense: Noordweste" (2 July 1993).



- 137 134. "Distriksrade van die Nasionale Party van Carnarvon, Van Wyksvlei, Fraserburg, Williston, Sutherland, Brandvlei, Calvinia en Loeriesfontein".
- 138 135. Municipality of Loeriesfontein.
- 139 136. "Loeriesfontein Boere-Unie".
- 140 137. "Fraserburg - Munisipale Raad, Bestuurskomitee van Ammerville en Sakekamer".
- 141 138. Ximoko Progressive Party - Inputs on Regional Delimitation with special reference to Region G (7 July 1993).
- 142 139. Democratic Party - East Cape Region.
- 143 140. Municipality of Plettenberg Bay.
- 145 141. Midland Chamber of Industries - Regional Demarcation: Eastern Cape (5 July 1993).
- 146 142. Venterstad - Inclusion of Venterstad into OFS.
- 147 143. East Cape Agriculture Union (5 July 1993).
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- 149 145. City of Grahamstown (8 July 1993).
- 150 146. Municipality of Oudtshoorn (8 July 1993).
- 151 147. Presentation by the Regional Convention of the Vaal Triangle.
- 152 148. Chief Pupsey Sebogadi, Braklaagte (8 July 1993).
- 153 149. JHB Consolidated Investment Company - Demarcation of Regions: West Rand.
- 154 150. Input regarding Midrand.
- 155 151. Bushveld Development Forum (8 July 1993).
- 156 152. Mr Peter Hancock - Planning a new capital for SA.
- 157 153. "OVS Provinsiale Administrasie - 'n Grondwetlike Streekbedeling - 'n OVS perspektief."
- 158 154. "Sasol 1 - Plasing van Sasolburg in 'n nuwe Streekbedeling."
- 159 155. "NOVS RSC - OVS Provinsie - Perspektiewe."
- 160 156. Port Natal/Ebhodwe, Joint Services Board - Demarcation Region E.
- 163 157. Kempton Park Town Council, 30 June 1993
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- 165 159. CG Smith Sugar Limited (29 June 1993).
  - 166 160. Hoekwil Local Council (30 June 1993).
  - 167 161. National Liberation Front - Sovereign Coloured State.
  - 168 162. "Kaapstad Sakekamer" (5 Julie 1993).
  - 169 163. "Munisipaliteit Carnarvon - Streekgrense: Noordweste" (5 July 1993).
  - 170 164. Masinusane Town Council (5 July 1993).
  - 171 165. Port Edward Rate Payers Association (5 July 1993).
  - 172 166. The Urban Foundation (6 July 1993)
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  - 175 169. Marburg Town Board (6 July 1993).
  - 176 170. Town Council of Ventersdorp (6 July 1993).
  - 177 171. Graham Gersbach, Edenvale (5 July 1993).
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  - 179 173. Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce and the Afrikaanse Sakekamer.
  - 180 174. Cedarville & Mvenyane (8 July 1993).
  - 181 175. Natal Provincial Administration - Community Services Branch (6 July 1993).
  - 182 176. The Matatiele Advice Centre.
  - 183 177. SANCO - Southern Transvaal (6 July 1993).
  - 185 178. Liberty Life (6 July 1993).
  - 186 179. Afrikaner Volksunie - Addendum to AVU submission.
  - 187 180. South African Police (9 July 1993).
  - 188 181. Gazankulu Council of Chiefs.
  - 189 182. Gazankulu Fith Legislative Assembly (9 July 1993).
  - 190 183. Prof AO de Lange, Agriculture and Rural Development Research institute.
  - 191 184. Golden West Forum (6 July 1993).



- 192 185. Kangwane Government - Proposal for an Eastern Transvaal Region (9 July 1993).
- 193 186. KwaNdebele Government/Intando Ye Sizwe Party (9 July 1993)
- 194 187. United Peoples Front - Lebowa (7 July 1993).
- 195 188. Drakensberg Stigting, (28 August 1993).
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- 198 191. Governor IS Meundisi (Bophuthatswana) (5 July 1993).
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- 200 193. Solidarity Party (8 July 1993).
- 201 194. National African Federated Chamber of Commerce & Industry.
- 202 195. Eastern Cape Society of Advocates, Grahamstown Members (9 July 1993).
- 203 196. Venda Government (7 July 1993).
- 204 197. Sentrale Karoo Regional Services Council (2 July 1993).
- 205 198. M B Read - "Streekindeling tov die Noord-Oos Kaap en Transkei" (7 Julie 1993).
- 206 199. JR Blaker - Environmental & Development Agency.
- 207 200. Municipality of Beaufort-West (2 July 1993).
- 208 201. Western Cape Agriculture Union (2 July 1993).
- 209 202. Borough of Kloof - Sub-Region West 1 and 2 of the Durban Functional Reggion (30 June 1993).
- 211 203. WD Howie - Anerly, Natal South Coast/East Griqualand and Region E
- 212 204. Die Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut.
- 213 205. Sterkstroom Farmers and Wool Growers' Association (5 July 1993).
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- 216 207. Midland Regional Services Council (6 July 1993).
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- 218 209. "Standertonse Afrikaanse Sakekamer" (6 July 1993).
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- 221 212. Port Elizabeth Chamber of Commerce (6 July 1993).
- 222 213. Municipality of De Aar (5 July 1993).
- 223 214. "Die Bloemfonteinse Afrikaanse Sakekamer" (4 July 1993).
- 224 215. The Mount Currie Farmers Association.
- 225 216. "Noord-Kaaplandse Landbou-Unie" (5 July 1993).
- 226 217. Grahamstown Capital Forum (6 July 1993).
- 227 218. Dr Andrew D Spiegel - University of Cape Town (5 July 1993).
- 228 219. Plettenberg Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association (5 July 1993).
- 229 220. National Party - Eastern Transvaal region (5 July 1993).
- 230 221. OFS Chamber of Business (6 July 1993).
- 231 222. Afrikaanse Sakekamer Pretoria.
- 232 223. Municipal Council of Christiana.
- 233 224. Mr P d J Cronje, Jefreysbaai (large wall map).
- 234 225. Municipality of Williston - Cape (30 June 1993).
- 235 226. Town Council of Fochville.
- 236 227. South African Communist Party.
- 237 228. Department of Education and Training - Cape Region (9 July 1993).
- 238 229. Umgeni Water, Pietermaritzburg (9 July 1993).
- 239 230. Association of Management Committees, Cape Town (8 July 1993).
- 240 231. Greater Algoa Regional Development Association, Port Elizabeth (8 July 1993).
- 241 232. EP Tourism Association (8 July 1993).
- 242 233. Pan Africanist Congress of Azania.
- 243 234. The City of Durban (2 July 1993).
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253	244. KwaZulu & Natal Association of Joint Services Board (5 July 1993).
254	245. Vereeniging City Council (2 July 1993).
255	246. Inkatha Freedom Party (2 July 1993).
256	247. RSCs of the Lowveld and escarpment, Highveld, Oosvaal on behalf of the community of the Eastern-Transvaal - Spotlight on Region F
257	248. SA Institute of Town and Regional Planners (9 July 1993).
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259	250. University of the Western Cape - Economic Policy Research Project (8 July 1993).
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262	253. The Hoedspruit Steering Committee for Regional Development - Region G (5 July 1993).
263	254. CJ Malherbe - Strand (LARGE MAP).
264	255. PWV - Consortium, Transportation Planning for the PWV area (1 July 1993).
265	256. National Regional Development Advisory Committee.
266	257. Cape Provincial Administration (24 June 1993).
267	258. VA Volker - MEC, National Party - East Griqualand should remain part of Region E (9 July 1993).
268	259. "Bethal Afrikaanse Sakekamer" (5 July 1993).
269	260. MEDUNSA - Service regions (5 July 1993).
270 <del>269</del>	261. SANCO - Northern Cape Region - Rietvale Civic Association (7 July 1993).



- 271 262. Wilderness Ratepayers Association (3 July 1993).
- 272 263. Borough of Matatiele (28 June 1993).
- 273 264. Borough of Kokstad (30 June 1993).
- 274 265. Free Cape Movement.
- 275 266. Cradock Municipality (9 July 1993).
- 276 267. Fanie & Hanneljie Schoeman (23 June 1993).
- 277 268. Association of Mayors/Chairmen and Chief Executive Officers of Local Authorities on the Natal Lower South Coast (18 June 1993).
- 278 269. Standing Committee on Water Supply and Sanitation.
- 279 270. H Toerien, Die Oranje-Vrystaat as vertrekpunt vir 'n streekregering.
- 280 271. Maximiso Buthelezi, KwaMashu.
- 281 272. SH Mntyali, Piet Retief.
- 282 273. Michael, Umlazi.
- 283 274. B Mthembu, Ratanda Heidelberg.
- 284 275. V Moodly, Durban.
- 285 276. M Luthuli, Durban.
- 286 277. E Mbhele.
- 287 278. Grahamstown Chamber of Commerce and Industry (14 July 1993).
- 288 279. Mr Tjaard du Plessis, Cresta.
- 289 280. Mr PR Mabapa, Soshanguve.
- 290 281. Mr O Sileya.
- 291 282. Bhekindawo Muthwa, Hlabisa.
- 292 283. Isaac Myeni, New Germany.
- 293 284. B I Ngwane, Kwa-Mashu.
- 294 285. G Mwandla, Durban.
- 295 286. Individual, Bushbuckridge.
- 296 287. Grahamstown Side-Bar Association (*Received after the deadline*).
- 297 288. City of Port Elizabeth (*Received after the deadline*).





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| 298 | 289. | Municipality of Cradock (15 July 1993) <i>(Received after the deadline)</i>   |
| 299 | 290. | Mr Reuben Sive - Oral submission.   |
| 300 | 291. | Transvaal Provincial and Witwatersrand Local Divisions of the Supreme Court.  |
| 301 | 292. | Chief MS Mankuroane.  |
| 302 | 293. | Pan Africanist Congress <i>(Received after the deadline)</i> .  |
| 303 | 294. | Vaal Triangle Metropolitam Area and the Civic Association Vaal Triangle <i>(Received after the deadline)</i> .            |
| 304 | 295. | Maclear Civic Association <i>(Received after the deadline)</i> .  |
| 305 | 296. | University of Cape Town - Institute of Development Law <i>(Received after the deadline)</i> .                             |
| 306 | 297. | LD van Wyk - Sunninghill, Financing of Local and Regional Government in the New SA <i>(Received after the deadline)</i> . |
| 307 | 298. | Nelspruit City Council <i>(Received after the deadline)</i> .   |
| 308 | 299. | Joseph M'tiyone, Richards Bay.  |
| 309 | 300. | "Boere Afrikanerland in Streekverband - Eenheidskomitee van 25" <i>(Received after the deadline)</i> .                    |
| 310 | 301. | Maclear Civic Association <i>(Received after the deadline)</i> .  |
| 311 | 302. | Vaal Civic Association - Sebokeng Branch <i>(Received after the deadline)</i> .   |
| 312 | 303. | Comondale Boerevereniging - 12 July 1993 <i>(Received after the deadline)</i>   |
| 313 | 304. | Prince Khuzulwandle - Swaziland Border Adjustment Committee <i>(Received after the deadline)</i> .                        |

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## APPENDIX C

### LIST OF ORAL HEARINGS HELD BY THE COMMISSION ON THE DELIMITATION/ DEMARCATION OF REGIONS

WORLD TRADE CENTRE MONDAY 5 JULY 1993
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1. JHB CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY
2. MR VAN DEVENTER - ESKOM
3. NORTH CHAMPAGNE ESTATES LANDOWNERS ASSOCIATION
4. STANDING COMMITTEE ON WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION
5. DIKWANKWETLA PARTY
6. SOAK J

WORLD TRADE CENTRE TUESDAY 6 JULY 1993
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7. MR PETER HANCOCK
8. EAST RAND REGIONAL SERVICES COUNCIL
9. REGIONAL CONVENTION OF THE VAAL TRIANGLE
10. ADV CHRIS DE JAGER - PRETORIA
11. AFRIKANER VOLKSUNIE
12. SACOB

WORLD TRADE CENTRE THURSDAY 8 JULY 1993
--

13. COUNCIL FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
14. TRANSVAAL AGRICULTURE UNION
15. BUSHVELD DEVELOPMENT FORUM
16. HIGHVELD REGIONAL SERVICES COUNCIL
17. REGIONAL DEV ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR REGION B
18. KIMBERLEY AFRIKAANSE SAKEKAMER
19. THABAZIMBI DISTRIKSLANBOU-UNIE

- 20. MR PUPSEY SEBOGADI - BRAKLAAGTE TRIBAL OFFICE
- 21. TOWN COUNCIL OF FOCHVILLE

CAPE TOWN MONDAY 5 JULY 1993
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- 22. NAMAQUALAND REGIONAL SERVICES COUNCIL
- 23. DEMOCRATIC PARTY
- 24. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE REGION A
- 25. CAPE OF GOOD HOPE PROVINCIAL DIVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
- 26. MESSRS J HORN/J SLAMBEE/N JANSEN
- 27. NOORDWESTE LEIERSFORUM
- 28. NORTH WEST REGIONAL SERVICES COUNCIL
- 29. NOORDWES-KAAPLANDSE ONTWIKKELINGSVERENIGING
- 30. NOORDWESTE TOERISME VERENIGING

CAPE TOWN TUESDAY 6 JULY 1993
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- 31. D E SMIT & M S VD SPUY
- 32. CALVINIA LANDELIKE RAAD
- 33. MUNICIPALITY OF LOERIESFONTEIN
- 34. LOERIESFONTEIN BOERE-UNIE
- 35. FRASERBURGSE AFRIKAANSE SAKEKAMER
- 36. BESTUURSKOMITEE: AMMERVILLE
- 37. MUNICIPALITY FRASERBURG



PORT ELIZABETH  
WEDNESDAY 7 JULY 1993

- 38. MIDLAND CHAMBER OF INDUSTRIES
- 39. DP: EASTERN CAPE REGION
- 40. MUNICIPALITY OF PLETTENBERG BAY
- 41. MUNICIPALITY KNYSNA
- 42. DRAKENSBERG REGIONAL SERVICES COUNCIL
- 43. EAST CAPE AGRICULTURE UNION
- 44. VENTERSTAD MUNICIPALITY
- 45. UPPER ORANGE RIVER REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION -  
REGION 11
- 46. PORT ELIZABETH CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
- 47. GRAHAMSTOWN CITY COUNCIL

DURBAN  
THURSDAY 8 JULY 1993

- 48. DURBAN REGIONAL CHAMBER OF BUSINESS
- 49. PORT NATAL/EBHODWE JOINT SERVICES BOARD
- 50. NATAL AGRICULTURE UNION
- 51. EAST GRIQUALAND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION

<p>WORLD TRADE CENTRE 16 JULY 1993</p>
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- 52. CHIEF MS MANKUROANE
- 53. MR RUEBEN SIVE
- 54. INTANDO YE SIZWE PARTY
- 55. JUDGES PRESIDENT
- 56. NATIONAL PARTY/GOVERNMENT
- 57. AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS
- 58. TRANSKEI GOVERNMENT
- 59. PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS OF AZANIA
- 60. GEN CONSTANT VILJOEN

<p>UMZIMKULU 21 JULY 1993</p>
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- 61. INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY
- 62. KWAZULU GOVERNMENT
- 63. TRANSKEI TRADITIONAL LEADERS/ TRADITIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CUSTOMS OF PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA
- 64. CONTRALESA
- 65. TRANSKEI HEALTH DEPARTMENT, UMZIMKULU HOSPITAL
- 66. MALUTI REGIONAL AUTHORITY/ANC/SADTU
- 67. UMZIMKULU REGIONAL AUTHORITY/CHIEFS OF UMZIMKULU
- 68. UMZIMKULU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
- 69. UMZIMKULU ATTORNEYS
- 70. QAWUKENI REGIONAL AUTHORITIES
- 71. LADAM REGIONAL AUTHORITY
- 72. LUSIKISIKI TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE: ANC, SACP, COSATU



- 73. PAC, UMZIMKULU
- 74. SADTU, UMZIMKULU
- 75. UMZIMKULU FARMERS UNION
- 76. UMZIMKULU CIVIC
- 77. SACP, UMZIMKULU
- 78. ANC, UMZIMKULU
- 79. ANC & SANCO, MACLEAR (REPRESENTING ANC/ SANCO-  
DRAKENSBERG REGION)
- 80. ANC - NTABANKULU BRANCH

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**LIST OF SUPPORT STAFF**

**Administrative Secretary**

**Mr Saul Bodibe**

**Technical Secretary**

**Dr Renosi Mokate**

**Administrative Support Staff**

**Mr Frans du Preez**

**Ms Thembi Mbobo**

**Mrs Dora Morobe**

**Mrs Ntombi Sithebe-Tsotetsi**

**Technical Support Team**

**Dr Sipho Buthelezi**

**Mr Neil de Beer**

**Mr Christo de Coning**

**Dr Bertus de Villiers**

**Prof JA du Pisanie**

**Mr Trevor Fowler**

**Mrs Dulcie Krige**

**Prof Jeff McCarthy**

**Prof Job Mokgoro**

**Mr PA Pienaar**

**Dr Olive Shisana**

**Prof Richard Tomlinson**



## **MINORITY OPINIONS**

## **COMMENTS ON MINORITY OPINIONS**



## **COMMENTS ON MINORITY OPINIONS**

The Commission functioned on the basis that members could have their dissensions recorded and the final report is prepared accordingly. Therefore, in finalising its report, the Commission was not aware that minority opinions were to be tabled. Two Commission members subsequently submitted minority opinions which resulted in the Commission reconvening in order to consider them.

### **OPINION BY MR. KOOS REYNEKE**

The Commission took note of Mr. Koos Reyneke's opinion.

The Commission is satisfied that it applied the criteria for the demarcation/delimitation of regions, provided in its terms of reference, appropriately in all its recommendations.

### **OPINION BY MS. ANN BERNSTEIN**

Ms. Bernstein's opinion contains many points which are already covered in the Commission's report ( see for example, the Commission's comments on pages 1, 8, 23 and 25 on the time limitations imposed on its brief). The content of her opinion is also not in all respects factually correct. Finally, the Commission is dismayed and finds it regrettable that Ms. Bernstein's report deemed it necessary to cast doubt on the professional integrity of the members of the Commission.

#### **The Commission distantiates itself from accusations that:**

1. The process embarked on by the Commission was undemocratic and lacked proper consultation.
2. The Commission attempted to "impose an undemocratic map on the country."
3. The Commission "believed" that "a hastily conceived map" which "represents a compromise between the different views of the members of the Commission was the appropriate role of an "expert" Commission."
4. Decisions were taken on insufficient information and/or knowledge.

#### **The Commission wishes to place on record that:**

1. It did not set out with a preconceived map or a specific number of regions, as explicitly set out in the working procedures of the Commission (see pages 2, 4, and 24-25).

2. Its recommendations were not based on a compromise, but that each Commission member had the fullest opportunity to debate and record his/her opposition to or disagreement with any of the recommendations. Ms. Bernstein availed herself of her right to dissent or concur on particular demarcations, and this has been recorded in the report.
3. Volumes of technical reports ( produced by a renowned team of experts appointed by the Commission), 304 written and 80 oral submissions, as well as a wealth of information from international experience were considered in the Commission's deliberations and final recommendations.
4. It affirms its confidence in the integrity of the Commission members and the Technical Support Team as highly skilled, independent professional people.
5. The Commission took cognisance of its brief to draw interim boundaries and therefore, as stated explicitly in the report, did not consider its recommendations to the Negotiating Council as the definitive and final decision on the demarcation of SPR's.
6. The Commission accepted the mandate of the Negotiating Council fully aware of the responsibility that this would entail, and regrets that Ms. Bernstein could not associate herself with the terms of reference that the Commission was mandated with.



**MINORITY OPINION: MR KOOS REYNEKE**

Monday, 26 July 1993

## MINORITY REPORT ON THE DEMARCATION OF STATES/PROVINCES/REGIONS

I could have signed this report if it was only a report on the demarcation of Regions.

If this is a report on the demarcation of States/Provinces/Regions (SPR's), as in the terms of our appointment by the Negotiating Forum, I can not sign it.

Three most valuable improvements were however made on the existing development regions with the demarcation of socio-cultural improved regions in the western "Tswana region", the north-western Cape "Afrikaans region" and the border between the "Zulu and Xhosa regions". *Unfortunately similar improvements in other parts of South Africa were not included, because of overriding "cohesion reasons" like economy, geographic coherence and so called homogeneity or regional identity.*


Peace and the creation of conflict free SPR's are pre-conditions to prevent a South African Bosnia. This is essential to restore international economic trust and an investor's climate.

Regions that would have benefited to a large extent with further "conflict reducing socio-cultural borders", are the eastern Cape, northern Transvaal, eastern Transvaal, the Orange Free State and in particular the PWV-region.

Herewith I would like to thank the commission for trying to accommodate me up to the very last hour of our final meeting, by even then changing in the final draft report many references to regions into SPR's, as well as removing objections I still had on statements and examples. Unfortunately two sentences in the paragraphs on sub-regions and a Volkstaat were then removed, therewith closing the door, on the possible future improvements as stated, including a future Volkstaat in between the other SPR's.

To accommodate the people on the ground and to demarcate final borders for States, Provinces or Regions that the people can identify with, it is necessary to do, and the process would require from us, a proper local survey.

Only then will peace follow




Koos Reyneke



# BESTAANDE 9 STREKE

Veronderstelde ekonomiese ontwikkelingsstreke  
(Intussen totaal onsuksesvol en ekonomies  
ongebalanseerd bewys asook kultureel-  
eties konflik stimulerend)



getalle  
(x 100 000)

100  
80  
60  
40  
20  
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## BEVOLKINGSVERSPREIDING

en KONFLIKANALISE  
VOORBEELDE:

**J** vrede

**H** konflik \*

**\* Gewelddige konflikpotensiaal in streek H:**

- \*Te veel rykdom!
- \*Te veel mense.
- \*Te groot verskeidenheid sterk groepe/volke
- \*BOERE ! (1,2 miljoen boere wat dalk deur ANC regeer gaan word!)

gemiddeld/aantal mense

gem/kap

TOTAAL  
ekon/kap

12 ZULU

11 XHOSA

10 SOTHO

9 N.SOTHO

8 TSWANA

7 KAAPS

6 ENGELS

5 BOER

4 SWAZI

3 AFRIKANER

2 ASIER

1 ANDER

relatiewe vrede  
"Volkstate"

Konflik !

tot. **A** **F** **H** **B** **J** **G** **C** **D** **E** streke

930612  
Koos Reyneke

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**MINORITY OPINION: MS ANN BERNSTEIN**



**THE COMMISSION ON THE DEMARCATION OF REGIONS**  
**A Plea for a More Democratic Approach on Regions**

*"Wrongly or hastily planned regions could well be a recipe for disastrous and violent fission along ethnic, racial or party political lines. By contrast, there are many positive developments that could flow from intelligently and sensitively constructed regions: the deepening and extension of democracy; the integration of regional sentiments into national politics; and the amelioration of regional economic imbalances."*

*Professor Gavin Maasdorp,  
May 1993*

Ann Bernstein  
Member of the Commission

July 1993




## OVERVIEW

*I have submitted this report because I believe that further public debate and consultation is necessary before the decisions on South Africa's regional map can be taken successfully. In particular, my standpoint is that:*

- *it is a mistake to impose an undemocratic map on the country;*
- *wider consultation would help to ensure that the positive facets of a regional system are realised; and*
- *the process of arriving at regional delimitations is at least as important as the boundaries themselves.*

*This report is intended as a constructive contribution to the negotiation process, and the transition to a democratic government as soon as possible. I hope it is received in this spirit.*



Ann Bernstein  
28 July 1993



# THE COMMISSION ON THE DEMARCATION OF REGIONS

## A Plea for a More Democratic Approach on Regions

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### 1. COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS

The author of this report is totally committed to a democratic South Africa in which all South Africans have the vote; the "homelands" are reincorporated and a united single country created. I believe South Africa needs a new and democratically elected government as soon as possible and I look forward to the day when I will be part of a country where the elected government does represent a majority of the voters and is held accountable for its actions to those voters at regular free and fair elections.

It is because of this commitment that I accepted the invitation to join the Commission on the Demarcation of Regions. I did this on the understanding that I was joining an independent non-party political commission charged with assisting the negotiating parties in their efforts to move South Africa towards democracy and elections as soon as possible.

### 2. NEGOTIATING COUNCIL RESOLUTION

The resolution of the Negotiating Council that established the Commission on Regions noted that

*"... whereas there appears to be broad agreement that the most suitable form of government for the future will be one which involves an allocation of powers to national and regional government... the differences that exist relate essentially to the boundaries, powers and functions of the regions/states/provinces and the process whereby such differences may be resolved" (own emphasis).*

It was against this background that the Commission was asked to *"make recommendations to the Negotiating Council within six weeks, on the delimitation of regions/states/provinces"*.

### 3. TWO FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES

It needs to be stated at the outset that some of my differences with the majority of the Commission members relate to the interpretation of our brief. In essence there are two issues :

- \* how one interprets this brief from the Negotiating Council;
- \* and how one understands the different roles of politicians (the Negotiating Council) and independent "experts";



It is my view that in six weeks it is possible to make a contribution to the "process" of understanding and resolving the issues involved and the differences that exist in the country around the detail of a regional map. To try and actually produce the regional map for the country in such a short time and think that this will resolve the differences that exist between all the many interests on this matter is to my mind totally unrealistic and dangerous.

Most other countries have spent far longer on the process of regional demarcation and for good reason (see the section in the Commission's report on the international experience). Boundaries are often the cause of violent regional or communal conflict and war.

I believe it is critically important that the roles of independent experts and those of political players are not confused. The "experts" should - to the best of their ability and as objectively as possible - identify, clarify and highlight the issues and choices that face the country and the implications of these different choices. "Experts" do not represent constituencies and they have no mandates on which to negotiate compromises. "Experts" are not accountable to anyone other than their own consciences and sense of professional ethics. Their contribution must be one of clarifying options and the implications of choosing the different options for the decision-makers.

It is the role of the politicians to actually make the choices, negotiate the compromises - on the best possible information available - and then live with the consequences of those choices i.e the assent or opposition of the voters.

On both these issues I found myself at odds with the majority of the Commission. They believed it was possible to produce a single map for the country in the six weeks given the Commission to complete its task. They also believed that the production of a single map that represents a compromise between the different views of members of the Commission was the appropriate role of an "expert" commission. On both these counts I disagreed.

#### 4. CRITERIA - NECESSARY BUT NOT SUFFICIENT

The Commission was asked to consider boundaries from both an electoral perspective (regions will be represented in the national legislature) but also from a constitutional perspective (regions will form the basis for new regional governments to be elected at the same time as the national legislature).

In order to guide the Commission in this work the negotiating process set out certain criteria to be considered in the process. These criteria are

*"historical boundaries, including provincial, magisterial and district boundaries and infrastructures; administrative considerations including the availability or non-availability of infrastructures and nodal points for services; the need or otherwise to rationalise existing structures (including the TBVC states, self-governing territories and regional governments); the necessity of limiting financial and other costs as much as is reasonably possible; the need to minimise inconvenience to the people; the need to minimise the dislocation of services; demographic considerations; economic viability; development potential; cultural and language realities."*



I support all of these criteria and believe that they form an important input to how one should think about regional demarcation. The problem is that these criteria are necessary for the process of regional demarcation but not sufficient. In other words it is possible to produce a number of different regional options all of which would satisfy the given criteria. For example the criteria do not help in deciding on the following kinds of issues :

- Should the Pretoria metropolitan functional area be a separate region or not (this is an urban region comprising 2,8 million people and with the highest population growth rate in the country)?
- Should the Northern or Eastern Transvaal incorporate Pretoria or not?
- Should Natal/KwaZulu be one region or two or three (this region has 8,8 million people - 23% of the total population of the country)?
- Should the Eastern Cape/Transkei/Ciskei be one large region or two separate regions?
- Should the Vaal Triangle be a part of the PWV region or a separate region?
- Should the Western Cape be a smaller region or incorporate the Northern Cape?
- Should the OFS be merged with the Western Transvaal or not?

Drawing a regional map will need to be based on considerations which go beyond those contained in the criteria identified by the Negotiating Council. For example a position on the desirability and functionality of large or small regions; OR a view on the likely consequences for present and future ethnic or race relations of creating certain regions rather than others.

The Commission did not consider the electoral implications of regional boundaries at all.

## 5. THE SUBMISSIONS - WHAT DID WE LEARN?

Upon its formation the Commission immediately called for written and oral submissions from the public on the demarcation of the country into regions. Despite the short time available for submissions to be made the Commission received 313 written submissions and heard some 84 oral presentations. The volume of response is a clear indication that South Africans from diverse walks of life consider the matter of regional delimitation in a very serious light. It also formed an enormous body of information and arguments for the Commission to absorb and analyse in the short period after receiving the submissions and before finalising its report.

What do we learn from this unexpected (to me at any rate) and energetic public response?



An analysis of this body of evidence to the commission reveals a number of important general features:

- \* the strong emotions that are attached to borders and boundaries in SA (some submissions said there would be "no compromise"; and that "this boundary could cause war");
- \* the enormous diversity of opinions and ideas and the complex range of issues that need to be considered in thinking about regional demarcation in a country as large and diverse as SA;
- \* the speed with which certain groups were able to respond and place considered proposals on the table (e.g. the Northern Transvaal Political Discussion Forum; the Eastern Transvaal groups; chambers of commerce and industry; certain municipalities);
- \* the many communities and identifiable interest groups that did not make submissions or representations to the Commission (e.g. non-homeland groupings in the Western Transvaal; local black communities in the Northern Transvaal; black communities on the PWV etc);
- \* the vitality of some local initiatives and burgeoning local democratic processes in the country; and the ability of these different local interests to reach agreement on their needs for the future (the most striking example is the submission from the Vaal Convention, representing municipalities, business, civics and the local IFP. Other examples are the Border-Kei Development Forum; the Northern Transvaal Political Discussion Forum; and the Plettenberg Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association);
- \* the state of flux in the national debate on a regional map with two leading political parties putting proposals to the Commission that were significantly different from their earlier contributions to the public debate (in the last year the ANC and the NP have put forward several different proposals on the demarcation of regions; another example was the SATSWA grouping that changed their preferred map in the course of the commission's deliberations);
- \* the very many submissions to the Commission that identified the need for further consultation before decisions were taken (South African Chamber of Business; the South African Communist Party, Eastern Cape; the Sandton Federation of Ratepayers Associations; the Batlhaping tribe in Taung; South African National Civic Association, Southern Transvaal; the National Regional Development Advisory Council; and at least 45 other submissions). The suggestion of the RDAC for Region H is typical: *"....if such adjustments are to be considered (to existing boundaries) the local communities and other bodies involved should first be properly consulted"*.

## 6. REGIONAL DEMARCATION - THE CRITICAL ISSUES

On the basis of the written and oral submissions the Commission is now in a position to identify the critical issues that need to be presented to the public and openly discussed and debated before drawing a regional map for the country. These issues are both substantive and procedural:



### Substantive issues :

- \* Are big or small regions more beneficial to the disadvantaged, the poor and those who have had the least in the past? Is it better for the poor in both urban and rural SA to be part of large and diverse regions or part of smaller more focused regions?
- \* Are big or small regions more conducive to economic growth and development delivery?
- \* Are big or small regions more likely to result in effective, efficient and slim regional governments?
- \* Are big or small regions more likely to accommodate South Africa's political diversity and promote racial reconciliation?
- \* Is it better for the country to have metropolitan regions (e.g the Durban functional region or the Pretoria functional region) or larger regions and then additionally elected metropolitan government and smaller local government as well? Is it worth having this extra tier of government and if so why and what are the benefits?
- \* What is the best approach to the PWV - undoubtedly the most important economic, development and political region in the country - the geographic area where the new South Africa will succeed and take the rest of the country with it or disintegrate into a violent and bloody conflict: what is best for the different component parts of the PWV; and what is the best arrangement of the PWV for the country as a whole and future inter-regional relationships?

### Procedural issues :

- \* How does a democratic society handle regional demarcation and balance the need to hear everyone with the need for speedy decisions?
- \* How best to reconcile the different positions that clearly emerge on regional boundaries?
- \* How does one reconcile local and regional interests and needs and national interests and needs? What is the best balance between the two and how should this be derived?
- \* How to deal with the problem that most black communities did not participate in the debate on regional borders?

It is clear that national political parties consulted within their own ranks on the regional demarcation. The ANC in particular seems to have had numerous discussions on this issue. However because of the very tight time constraints and the changing perception by the political parties of the "ideal" map for South Africa it is certain that there are very many local and perhaps even regional communities who have not yet participated fully (or at all) in the debate about regional boundaries.



## 7. TWO OPTIONS FOR THE NEGOTIATING COUNCIL

How should the politicians respond to these complex substantive and procedural issues?

It seems to me there are two kinds of response

### OPTION 1 "National politics is paramount"

One response is the view that the only issue that matters in SA in 1993 is how to broker a national political settlement as quickly as possible and therefore the only views that should be given serious consideration are those of the national political parties.

Therefore the way to draw the regional map is to negotiate a reconciliation of the maps of the different national political parties. In this model the map of South Africa's new regions becomes a vehicle for pushing the political deal along speedily and trying to bring as many of the national political interests into the process as possible. A group of people can then look at the maps of the different national political parties and based on their knowledge and opinions concerning the issues that face the country make some judgements on what the "best" compromise map could look like (this can be done very quickly and in many respects the Commission's proposed map does just this).

### OPTION 2 "Political, economic and development considerations are equally important"

A different response is the view that says SA faces a triple crisis - the political challenge and the economic growth and development challenge. And although this makes the transition to democracy more difficult in the short term it is nonetheless the reality that we face. Ignoring the socio-economic issues will make democracy impossible in the medium term.

Therefore tempting as it is to only worry about national politics in demarcating the regions, this approach argues that the demarcation of future regional governments needs to be thought about in terms of South Africa's political needs and its socio-economic development needs as well. This then means that not only are national AND local political considerations important but some fundamental development issues as well.

## 8. AVAILABLE EVIDENCE AND INFORMATION NOT SUFFICIENT FOR CRITICAL DECISIONS

As a member of the Commission I have to state that on the available information I myself am not at all clear on at least four of the critical issues that face the Negotiating Council :

- \* what would be best for either the people living in the Border/Kei area or the country as a whole if the entire Eastern Cape were made into one region;



- \* similarly I am not yet convinced either way as to the positive or negative ramifications of separating Pretoria from the Witwatersrand;
- \* I do not fully understand the implications for the mainly "coloured" people of the Northern Cape of deciding that it will be a separate region;
- \* and I have a very limited perspective on myriad local issues, where communities and other interests have strong views on where they would like to be relative to regional boundaries.

It is my view that on the evidence and technical information presently available to the commission it is extremely difficult to argue the definitive case in any of these four examples one way or the other.

What I do know is that apartheid is now dead and that a new government elected by the majority of South Africans will need to address the many important issues that have been ignored and distorted for so long. This new government will be fighting for its political and economic survival and it will have to reverse the past four decades failure with respect to development generally and regional development in particular. In this context some fundamental rethinking is necessary and this must apply to the regional debate as much as any other topic.

I would suggest that the first step on the path of progress is to honestly admit that there are more unknowns in our search for solutions than there are knowns. The second step is to question all the assumptions we carry with us based on South Africa's past and that must include all the so-called development regions. What we have to do is really listen to local and regional communities and the different interests in those communities and how they perceive what is best for them and then based on the current and best understanding of the local and international experience that is relevant to the new and uncharted waters of strong regions make a decision. To my mind this has not yet been done in anywhere near an adequate manner.

## 9. TIME CONSTRAINTS AND DEMOCRACY

I am well aware of the time constraints within which the politicians are battling to forge "the new South Africa". I should therefore not be misunderstood. I am not arguing a counsel of perfection on regional demarcation but I am arguing for a more cautious, more humble, more democratic and consultative approach.

As in other areas where negotiations have stumbled in the past, I am suggesting that when it comes to an acceptable regional map of the country "more haste could mean less speed".

- \* It is possible to now identify the areas of considerable disagreement and potential conflict around the boundaries question.
- \* It is also possible to meet some of the gaps in the evidence to the Commission particularly from black South Africans by identifying conflict areas and organising special public hearings in order to listen to local views and especially encourage black communities in those areas to participate and put forward their concerns.



- \* The areas of conflict are such that in this process of consultation and further assessment all the above identified substantive and procedural issues can be more fully considered.
- \* Allowing further debate and consultation in the most contested areas will only help the process of acceptance of the regional map when it is finalised. Not only will the map drafters know and understand more about the issues that it must decide on but it will be much harder for anyone to argue that their point of view was not heard or fully debated.

It needs to be pointed out that the Regional Commission did not operate on a full time basis over the past six weeks. Groups of Commissioners participated in some nine days of oral hearings in various parts of the country (Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth, Umzimkulu, World Trade Centre), and the full Commission met on seven occasions over the six week period.

#### 10. THE WAY FORWARD

The Negotiating Council should see the work of the Commission as the beginning of the process of regional demarcation and not the end. In order to get a regional map for the country as soon as possible, and in effect link the concerns of Options 1 and 2, I would suggest the following practical steps :

- \* The Negotiating Council should agree the areas of greatest difficulty and most importance in the regional demarcation process for the future of the country;

I would suggest that these are :

- the Eastern Cape/Transkei/Ciskei area - should there be one or two regions here;
  - the Northern Transvaal - in particular what do black people in this region think would be best for their future;
  - the Northern Cape - should there be a separate region in this area and in particular what effect will this have on the poor;
  - the PWV, in particular the Pretoria functional region and the Vaal Triangle - should they be a part of the PWV or separate or join another region? What would be best for the country; and for the component parts of the PWV?
- \* Public hearings in these areas should be arranged by a delegation from the Negotiating Council or the Commission on Regions so that the debate about their future can be further developed and heard more widely.



- \* The Negotiating Council should clarify the constitutional issues that fundamentally affect the regional boundaries :
  - the powers and functions of the regions;
  - role and powers of metropolitan areas, cities and towns and their relationships with central and regional government;
  - the powers of regions in the central legislature;
  - the nature of the fiscal transfers to regions.

On the basis of this further information it will be possible for the Negotiating Council to agree a map that not only has a better chance of dealing with the country's political, social and economic challenges but is also likely to be more widely accepted.

#### CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is important to remember why the negotiating parties have agreed to regions at all. As I see it there are three important national objectives for the establishment of regions and that regions must fulfil. The first is the need to build one South African nation in which diversity is encouraged and conflict is reduced. The second is the contribution of decentralized government to building a democratic culture in the country and bringing government closer to the people. The third is the need for inter and intra-regional development in South Africa that will contribute to national economic growth and an improved quality of life for all South Africans.

The Commission decided to interpret its brief as the quick production of a map of the proposed new regions for the country and that in essence is the substance of their report to the Negotiating Council.

I am unable to sign this report because

- \* I do not believe that a hastily conceived map which is a compromise of the views of individual commissioners is the appropriate response to the complexity of the regional demarcation process.
- \* I do not believe that the most useful contribution of the Commission is to produce a hastily conceived single map for the Negotiating Council.
- \* I believe that the politicians and the wider public need to be fully apprised of the critical issues that face the regional demarcation process and that a decision then needs to be made by the Negotiating Council on how best to proceed.
- \* There are very strong views in the country concerning land and borders and it would be an error to underestimate these emotions.



- \* There are also important consequences of not drawing effective regional boundaries. SA faces a severe crisis of economic growth, development delivery and political legitimacy and stability. The creation of regions is a mechanism that will have to facilitate progress in all of these areas. We need more considered public debate on these matters before decisions are made.
- \* If you consider the response within one month to the Commission's call for public submissions, I feel confident that a focused and structured attempt to take the debate further and hear more evidence will be possible in a short time and will deliver important benefits (it is worth noting that with 3-4 days notice a public hearing was organised in the Umzimkulu area which was attended by over 500 people. Some 19 organisations sent delegations to appear before the commission).

**I am not advocating delay in the political negotiations process or the holding of elections. It is possible to proceed with all other arrangements that are necessary and only finalize the regional map in September October. This will not affect preparations for the elections and will enhance people's commitment to the new constitution and its regional governments.**

**I would strongly urge the negotiating parties not to impose an undemocratic map on the country. I cannot see how the cause of democracy is strengthened and assisted by this haste. I can only see the negative consequences of making the wrong decisions and finalising the regions without adequate consultation and public participation.**

Ann Bernstein  
July 1993

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